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Executive summary 
 
The story of the Spanish economy in EMU is a dazzling one, though its brilliance 
is dimming and clouds can be seen on the horizon. But Spanish private and public 
agents still have time to send the right messages and take the right action before 
the clouds close in. 
 
Since the launch of the euro in 1995, Spain has enjoyed a virtuous economic cycle 
of high GDP growth, outstanding job creation, and relatively low inflation.  
 
Between 1995 and 2003 real GDP grew in Spain at an annual average rate of 
3.25%. This compares with a rate of below 2% in the euro area. Moreover, at 
2.5% per year between 2001 and 2003, growth was much higher than in previous 
recessive phases of the cycle, 1980-1982 or 1992-1994, when GDP grew at a 
meagre 0.8% per year.  
 
Employment has also registered a record performance since the mid-1990s. 
Between 1995 and 2003, civilian employment grew at an average rate of 3.5% 
(compared with 1.2% in the euro area as a whole). Strikingly, employment grew 
at 2.8% per year between 2001 and 2003, while jobs were lost at rates of 2% per 
year over 1980-1982 and 1992-1994. The unemployment rate declined in parallel 
from over 18% in the mid-nineties to just under 11% in 2003. The inflation rate 
also fell steadily, bottoming out at 1.8% in 1998.  
 
At consequence of such a performance is that the real GDP per capita gap 
between Spain and the euro area narrowed by more than 7 percentage points in a 
decade (from 79% in the mid-1990s to more than 86% in 2003). 
 
Looking at how demand and output have contributed to this positive record over 
recent years, the study shows that growth has come above all from dynamic 
domestic demand. Private consumption has been especially resilient over this 
cycle due to strong job creation and loose monetary conditions, which yielded 
positive expectations of higher permanent income. In parallel, the construction 
sector, particularly as a result of the strong demand for housing investment, 
seems to be enjoying a golden age with growth rates ranging from close to 4% to 
well beyond.  
 
A note of caution must be sounded, however, since rapidly increasing housing 
prices and a massive acquisition of dwellings are fuelling household 
indebtedness, which now represents almost 100% of gross disposable income, 
twice as much as in the mid-1990s. This is becoming a major cause of concern, 
since any significant shock on interest rates might have a negative income effect 
on consumption. Moreover, investment in equipment has a poor record over the 
period, with growth rates not only entering negative territory in 2001 and 2002, 
but continuing rather flat afterwards. Thus, while investment in infrastructure 
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involves clear positive spillovers on other sectors' productivity, the current bias of 
capital formation in favour of residential construction is unlikely to provide an 
adequate foundation for sustained high growth in the long run.  
 
Furthermore, the contribution of external demand has been negative on average 
over the whole 1995-2003 period, with the trade balance in the red by above 5% 
of GDP since 1999. This deficit, coupled with a historically declining surplus in 
services trade and a more negative balance of primary incomes, tipped the 
current account into the red already in 1998, and pushed it as low as -3.2 % of 
GDP in 2003.  
 
An examination of macroeconomic policies shows that although fiscal policy has 
contributed to growth through dynamic public consumption and direct tax cuts, 
the fiscal stance has been tight, in contrast with the fiscal loosening observed in 
some large economies of the euro area, and would therefore not seem to be the 
most important factor behind high GDP and employment performance in Spain. 
Nevertheless, no doubt, sound fiscal policies, by delivering macroeconomic 
stability, have enhanced potential growth in Spain. On the other hand, once the 
conduct of monetary policy was taken over by the ECB, a single, relatively low 
interest rate, combined with a positive inflation differential with the euro area, 
induced a growth-supportive monetary loosening in Spain since 1999. Overall, 
therefore, the policy mix has been broadly neutral and does not seem per se to 
provide a complete explanation for the performance of the Spanish economy since 
the mid-nineties. Nevertheless, it should be born in mind that fiscal policy, 
through the consolidation efforts, may have contributed to macroeconomic 
stability and higher economic growth.   
 
One particularly positive achievement was the successful expenditure-based fiscal 
consolidation in the second half of the nineties, supported by healthy growth 
rates, buoyant job creation and the sharp fall in interest rates which helped 
reduce the debt burden. Accordingly, between 1995 and 2003 the budget balance 
increased from a deficit of 6.6% of GDP to a surplus of 0.4%, while debt levels 
were reduced by 17 percentage points of GDP to below 51%. Moreover, personal 
income tax reforms in 1998 and 2002 aimed at lowering marginal taxes, reducing 
tax breaks, and providing incentives for higher participation in the labour market 
may indeed have triggered private agents' confidence and contributed to growth 
and job creation without jeopardising fiscal consolidation.  
 
However, in the long term, it is of paramount importance to reinforce spending 
control mechanisms to ensure continued sound public finances without resorting 
to tax increases. In addition, while a number of measures have already been 
adopted to cushion the budgetary impact of the ageing of the Spanish population 
by increasing labour market participation, reducing public debt, and building up 
the pension fund reserve, further action on pensions and health care is also 
needed. Specifically, the relationship between contributions and benefits in the 
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public pension system should be strengthened, as recommended in the recently 
renewed Pacto de Toledo. 
 
One way of ensuring the sustainability of public finances is to accompany job 
creation with high growth, which, in turn, depends on the productivity growth 
rate. The combination of high job creation and dynamic productivity growth is the 
foundation for a balanced real convergence. That real convergence has 
accelerated since the launching of the euro is simply a matter of fact. It is also a 
fact that the convergence process has come from outstanding job creation. 
However, not much capital, be it physical, human or knowledge, has been 
accumulated, and this has led to low productivity growth which, coupled with 
persistent inflation differentials, is a drag on the competitive position of the 
Spanish economy.  
 
Since the mid-nineties the employment rate, which measures the percentage of the 
working-age population with a job, has increased by 13 percentage points in 
Spain, compared with only 4.5 percentage points in the euro area. However, 
productivity grew in Spain at only 0.6% between 1995 and 2003, while the figure 
for the euro area was almost 1%. Moreover, Spain’s productivity growth has 
actually slowed down since 1995 compared with the period 1985-1995, when the 
annual average growth rate was almost 1.5%. Therefore, it seems that 
productivity is the issue, but this does not mean that labour market outcomes 
should be disregarded. 
 
Specifically, although growing fast, the employment rate is still low by European 
standards and far from the Lisbon target of 70%. High job creation has reduced 
the unemployment rate by 7 percentage points, but at 11% the Spanish 
unemployment rate is still the highest within the euro area (8.4%), with certain 
geographical areas and women and young workers particularly badly affected. 
 
One way of improving the labour market would be to significantly increase 
funding for active labour market policies, which is among the lowest in the euro 
area. The available funding for employment services and for training is also very 
limited. Efforts to increase female employability should also be stepped up, 
especially through greater use of part-time contracts, which now account for only 
8% of total employment. In addition, there seems to be a broad consensus that the 
use of fixed-term contracts in Spain is excessive, at 30% of all jobs. Although 
fixed-term contracts have been instrumental in job creation and have made the 
workforce more flexible and adaptable to changing economic conditions, they 
have also led to a high degree of labour market segmentation between temporary 
and permanent workers. Too high a rate of use of fixed-term contracts reduces 
geographical mobility and has negative effects on human capital since these 
temporary workers may not receive enough on-the-job training. It might be 
possible to alleviate this by promoting the use of permanent contracts with lower 
firing costs, such as those introduced in 1997, and by closer monitoring of fixed-
term contracts to ensure that they are not applied beyond the legal purpose of 
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covering temporary needs. Finally, unemployment disparities across regions 
could be mitigated if wage-setting institutions better reflected regional and other 
productivity differentials. In this respect, indexation clauses in wage agreements 
may still be a source of inflation tensions that introduces distortions in the 
functioning of the labour market and contributes to inflation persistence, 
especially in the current juncture of relatively high inflation due to external 
shocks. In this respect, the substitution of indexation by other bargaining 
mechanisms including a closer link between wage increases and productivity 
growth would lead to more efficient results. 
 
Despite these imbalances in the structure of employment and unemployment, the 
labour market performance has been remarkable compared with productivity 
growth which, as mentioned above, remains problematic. Although a sort of 
trade-off between employment and productivity seems to exist in Spain and, to a 
lesser extent, in the euro area, the reason productivity is growing slowly is not 
because job creation is high but rather because there is not enough capital 
accumulation or technical progress. The capital stock per person employed grew 
at similar rates in Spain and in the euro area at 1% per year between 1995 and 
2003. This is unsatisfactory because it means that Spain, a low capital-labour-
ratio country, is not catching up with the euro area. As a result, the ratio in Spain 
remains at only 67% that of the euro area, reflecting a relatively high share of 
labour-intensive activities in Spain, notably tourism and construction. 
 
The euro area is also outpacing Spain in the field of technical progress. Although 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth has slowed down in both Spain and the 
euro area since the nineties, the growth rate remains twice as high in the euro 
area as in Spain (0.3%). Low TFP growth is in part a consequence of a low 
accumulation of both human capital and knowledge capital. Educational 
attainment (the percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at 
least upper secondary education) is below the euro-area average, and vocational 
training is also less developed in Spain than in other advanced economies. And at 
1% of GDP, R&D and innovation expenditures in Spain are among the lowest in 
the euro area. Although the tax credit scheme for promoting R&D in Spain is 
among the most generous in the OECD, the development of innovative projects is 
held back by the insufficient expansion of risk capital funds. Moreover, the share 
of both gross value added and per capita expenditure on information and 
communication technologies is only 75% of the European average. 
 
Spain’s particular production structure mirrors its low productivity. 
Manufacturing is crucial for production and absorption of new technologies, but 
the share of manufactures in total gross value added in Spain is relatively low 
compared to other large EU countries. Although a downward trend in the relative 
weight of low-technology goods has been observed over the last few years, the 
gap between Spain and the EU in the production of high-technology goods has 
widened. Furthermore, the relatively low weight of high-tech activities in total 
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production is not compensated by imports, since the share of high-tech imports in 
total imports in Spain remains below the EU average. 
 
Closely linked to the productivity slowdown, the traditional comparative 
advantages enjoyed by Spain, significantly based on low production costs, seem to 
be fading away. In the past, price-competitiveness advantages were also 
underpinned by currency devaluations. However, the nominal exchange rate is no 
longer an adjustment instrument in EMU, and inflation differentials result in 
losses in competitiveness unless they are offset by productivity differentials. This 
is not the case of Spain, where low productivity growth, mainly in tradables, 
coupled with malfunctioning product markets, is contributing to persistent higher 
inflation. This, combined with the appreciation of the euro in the last few years, is 
undermining the competitive position of the Spanish economy, not only in goods 
markets, but also in the tourism industry, where stronger competition from low-
cost Mediterranean countries, a decline in price-competitiveness, and a certain 
obsolescence in tourist facilities in some areas is making it increasingly difficult 
for the Spanish tourism industry to hold on to its market share. 
 
A sustainable improvement of the Spanish international competitiveness requires 
a radical shift by moving away from the current price-based model to a 
specialisation pattern based on product differentiation underpinned by higher 
productivity growth. Nowadays, when a broad consensus on the need to maintain 
stability-oriented macroeconomic policies has been reached within Spanish 
society, the productivity goal must be brought to the top of the economic policy 
agenda in order to promote the necessary structural changes. The adequate 
policies, many of them spelled out through this Country Study, are well-known, 
and would lead to a significant, efficient accumulation of physical, human and 
knowledge capital. Furthermore, this agenda should also look at the institutional 
setting. Specifically, measures should be taken to improve the functioning of 
labour, capital and product markets.  
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Spain in EMU: A virtuous long-lasting cycle? 
 
 
1. The Spanish economy in EMU. A historical perspective 
  
Since the launching of the euro in 1995, the Spanish economy is apparently 
immersed in a virtuous cycle in which high GDP growth comes hand in hand with 
outstanding job creation and relatively low inflation. Between 1995 and 2003, real 
GDP grew in Spain at an average rate of 3.3% per year, which compares with 2% 
in the euro area. This is somewhat higher than in the previous cycle, 1985-1994, 
when the Spanish GDP grew at less than 3% per year (2.5% in the euro area)1. 
Interestingly, the growth differential between 1995-2003 and 1985-1994 actually 
comes from a radically different performance during the corresponding 
recessions. Between 2001 and 2003 GDP grew in Spain at almost 2.5% per year, 
compared with 0.75% between 1992 and 1994 and 0.80% between 1980 and 
1982.  The growth rates for the euro area as a whole remained at around 1% in the 
three recessive periods here considered. According to the 2004 Autumn 
Commission Forecast, the growth differential, although still positive, is expected 
to narrow to around half a percentage point in 2004 and 2005.  
 
Figure 1: Real GDP growth, 1960-2005 
  Source: AMECO
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Employment also registered a record performance. Between 1995 and 2003, 
civilian employment, measured in persons grew at an average rate of 2.5% per 
year in Spain, more than the double of the 1.1% in the euro area. The annual 
average growth rate over 2001-2003 was 1.9%, compared with a rate of 0.7% in 
the euro area. This contrasts with the employment performance in the recessions 
of the eighties and nineties. Jobs were destroyed at rates of 2.1% and 1.6% during 
                                                 
1 Indeed, these rates are well below the 7% recorded between 1961 and 1964 (5% in the euro area), 
when Spain was a low-income, fast-growing, catching up economy. 
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1980-1982 and 1992-1994, respectively. According to the Commission Autumn 
2004 forecast, the positive gap of employment growth with the euro area is 
projected to narrow to one percentage point up to 2005.    
 
Figure 2: Employment growth (LFS) and averages, 1960-2005 
Source: AMECO
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This Country Study analyses whether this high economic performance of the 
Spanish economy can be maintained in the medium to long term. The Study 
identifies the factors underpinning high growth and job creation and assesses the 
imbalances and risks that might jeopardise the ongoing real convergence with the 
euro area in the near future. But before, this introductory chapter summarises the 
salient features of the current cycle within a long-term historical framework. 
 
The rest of the Country Study is structured around two parts. Part I, with two 
chapters, analyses the behaviour of the components of aggregate demand (chapter 
2) and the role played by macroeconomic policies (chapter 3), putting a particular 
emphasis on the fiscal consolidation process that has taken place in Spain in the 
recent past. Part II is concerned with supply-side aspects of growth and 
competitiveness. Here the emphasis is put on the functioning and outcomes of the 
labour market (chapter 4), while chapter 5 analyses the causes of slow 
productivity growth. Finally, chapter 6 analyses inflation differentials between 
Spain and the euro area and assesses their implications for the external 
competitiveness of the Spanish economy. 
 
A catching-up economy 
 
Growth and employment performance in Spain has gradually narrowed the per 
capita GDP gap vis-à-vis the euro area, well beyond the peak reached before the 
first oil shock, when the Spanish per capita GDP had attained 80% of the euro 
area average (Figure 3). Nowadays, the figure is above 86%. The outstanding 
performance recorded between 1960 and 1975 was the fruit of abandoning 
autarky and acceding to different international organisations in the late 1950s. In 
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parallel, a new economic policy was implemented, which aimed at integrating the 
Spanish economy in the international labour division, through less regulated 
markets and increasing openness. The latter was further enhanced by the 1970 
trade agreement with the, at the time, European Economic Community.  
 
This period of sustained economic growth was interrupted in the aftermath of the 
oil shocks in 1973 and 1981. This is the toll Spain paid for the wrong design of 
economic policies during the transition to democracy. Since the accession to the 
EU in 1986, the Spanish per capita GDP recovered gradually to reach again the 
level of 1975 at around the mid nineties. Against this background, the strong 
convergence process observed during the last eight to ten years might not have a 
clear distinguishing feature in historical standards. However, looking at the most 
recent developments, and the medium-term projections, the performance recorded 
since 2001 represents a change compared to previous business cycles. While in 
past recessions convergence slowed down or even reversed, the convergence 
process has actually accelerated during the last three or four years.  
 
Figure 3: Real GDP per head in PPS (Euro area = 100), 1960-2005 
Source: AMECO
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Compared with its main European partners, Spain has followed an asymmetric 
evolution through the business cycles during the latest 30 years. While GDP grew 
sharply and above the largest EU economies in the upturns, which is a typical 
feature of an economy immersed in a strong catching-up process, the slowdowns 
were comparable or even deeper in Spain than in the most advanced of its 
European partners. For instance (Figure 1), while the GDP growth in Spain in 
1981 went to red territory (-0.1%), the rate in the euro area was positive and close 
to 0.5%. Analogously, in 1993, GDP fell in Spain by 1%, compared to -0.8% in 
the euro area. However, since the mid 1990s this behaviour seems to have 
changed. The growth rate recorded in Spain in 2002 (above 2%) was more than 
double that in the euro area (slightly below 1%). The figures for 2003 indicate that 
the Spanish economy is growing 5 times faster than in the euro area (almost 2.5% 
compared with 0.5%). However, according to the Commission Autumn 2004 
forecasts, this gap is expected to narrow in the medium term. 
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All in all, the Spanish economy has been growing much closer to its potential 
during the last 10 years or so than before. This might in principle be in line with 
theoretical and empirical findings in the economic literature. Output volatility is 
negatively correlated with the size of the public sector and with the size of the 
economy, while trade openness increases the exposure to external shocks and 
therefore output volatility (Galí, 1994, Fatás and Mihov, 2001 and Martinez-
Mongay and Sekkat, 2003). Therefore, in the Spanish case, and in spite of fast 
trade liberalisation, the simultaneous increase of the size of the economy, as a 
result of high GDP growth, and of the size of the public sector might be behind 
lower output volatility. In particular, the Spanish public sector, measured by the 
ratio of expenditures to GDP, has grown by 20 percentage points over the last 30 
years, which, in turn, was driven by real convergence, demographic changes and 
rising trade openness (Rodrick, 1998, Martinez-Mongay, 2002). Although, all 
these factors have played an indisputable role in lowering volatility, they do not 
seem to explain the drastic increase in output stability observed in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, when output volatility in Spain was below that of the euro area, a 
richer, older and more open economy. Beyond such long-trend factors, the 
structure of the demand, economic policies and, in particular the implementation 
of structural reforms and stability-oriented policies in Spain, seem to have played 
a paramount role.  Such factors are analysed in different parts of this Country 
Study. The sustainability of the Spanish growth model from the demand side is 
analysed in chapter 2, while, for the supply side, chapter 5 looks at productivity 
developments. 
 
Opening and restructuring 
 
The Spanish accession to the EU in 1986 represented a major regime shift, which 
is paramount to understand its economic performance up to the present. The 
economic integration in the EU triggered the degree of openness, still relatively 
low despite the reforms adopted in the 1960s. Since the accession to the EU the 
average ratio of total imports and exports to GDP raised gradually by almost 10 
percentage points to around 30% in 2003, which is comparable to other EU large 
economies. Economic integration has also changed the geographic structure of 
trade. Nearly 70% of the external trade of Spain is now carried out within the EU, 
which compares with around 50% before the accession. Integration has not only 
enhanced the commercial links of Spain vis-à-vis the largest EU economies, but 
also a higher exposure to shocks and spillovers from the EU. 
 
Gradual trade opening accelerated the industrial restructuring initiated at the 
beginning of the 1980s in the aftermath of the second oil crisis. Restructuring was 
costly in terms of job losses. The unemployment rate jumped from below 9% at 
the end of the seventies to above 18% in the mid-eighties, and picked up at 20% 
in 1994. Unemployment persistence, which has been a distinctive feature of the 
Spanish economy until recently, was the result of several factors acting in the 
same direction: a sharp re-composition of the labour force and the productive 
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structure, which led to a marked decline in employment in the primary sector, as 
well as massive employment destruction in industrial activities, coupled with rigid 
labour market institutions, and thus with rising labour costs.  
 
High and persistent unemployment prompted a labour market reform in 1984, 
which was instrumental to job creation. During the economic boom in the second 
half of the eighties, the unemployment rate went down to around 16% by 1991. 
Labour rigidities, which enhanced the persistence of adverse shocks (Dolado and 
Jimeno, 1997), coupled with the incorporation of the baby boom cohorts and 
women into the labour market in the late eighties and the early nineties, pushed 
the unemployment rate above 20% in the 1993 slowdown. Since the second half 
of the 1990s the unemployment rate fell significantly below 15% to nearly 11% in 
2003 (Figure 4). According to the 2004 Autumn Commission Forecast, the 
unemployment rate in Spain should keep falling, while it is projected to stabilise 
in the euro area. Moreover, the resilience of employment growth has been 
particularly impressive during the last ten years. Since 1995, more than 25% of 
the total net job creation in the euro area was registered in Spain. Such 
(un)employment performance could point to a major structural change with 
respect to the past. Both employment performance and labour market reforms are 
analysed in chapter 4.  
 
Figure 4: Unemployment rate in Spain and the euro-area, 1970-2005 
Source: AMECO
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Persistent inflationary pressures  
 
The two oil shocks led to double-digit inflation rates, which lasted until the mid 
eighties. Immediately after the accession to the EU, inflation was around 9% 
(Figure 5). The disinflation process turned out to be very slow and lacked 
continuity. Inflation rates situated between 6% and 7% at the end of the 1980s. 
Indeed, such inflation developments mirrored a lack of wage moderation and 
distorting labour and product market institutions. Price and wage developments 
moderated notably since the mid 1990s. As a result, real unit labour costs (RULC) 
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have been falling since then, in sharp contrast with the period 1987-1993, when 
they rose in Spain but fell in the euro area. Price-stability oriented monetary 
policies and wage moderation, underpinned by low import prices, allowed for a 
steady reduction of inflation rates, which bottomed out in 1998 with Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) inflation of 1.8%. Since then, the inflation differential between 
Spain and the euro-area has ranged between 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points. 
Although lower than in the past, the persistence of the inflation differential 
between Spain and the euro area may have a negative impact on the competitive 
position of the Spanish economy. This issue is discussed in chapter 6.   
 
Figure 5: Consumer price developments, 1970-2005 (annual percentage 
change)  
Source: AMECO, INE and New Cronos
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Re-balancing the policy mix 
 
Between the seventies and the early eighties the policy mix was particularly 
unbalanced. Trying to compensate the effects of the two supply shocks (oil price 
hikes) on output and employment, fiscal policy was expansive in the seventies and 
part of the eighties, a policy mistake common to many EU countries at the time. 
This brought ramping public deficits (Figure 6), and further inflationary pressures. 
Such expansionary policies had also a more structural nature and tried to respond 
to social demands for building up the welfare state, little developed in Spain 
before 1975. Political difficulties to cut expenditures and the need to put in place a 
modern tax system resulted in a unsuccessful consolidation programme on the eve 
of the Spanish accession to the EU, where tax reforms aimed at increasing 
revenues in order to keep deficits under control. Unsurprisingly, the higher tax 
burden was unable to keep pace with expenditure needs, leading to persistent 
deficits and debt accumulation, which reached 4.3% and 44.3% of GDP 
respectively in 1991, on the eve of the recession of the early 1990s, thus unveiling 
serious sustainability risks (see e.g. De Castro and Hernández de Cos, 2002). This 
expansive budgetary policy contributed to higher long-term inflation expectations, 
and widened the current account deficit. As a consequence, macroeconomic 
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stabilization had to exclusively rely on tight monetary policies, entailing high 
interest rates between 1983 and 1993 and an over-appreciation of the real 
exchange rate since 1989, when Spain joined the ERM system until 1992. 
 
The recession of 1992-1993 could only deteriorate further the budgetary position. 
The nominal deficit jumped to 6.7% of GDP in 1993, and the debt-to-GDP ratio 
rose to exceed 60%, while the interest burden increased above 5% of GDP, almost 
one point higher than in previous years. Such fiscal imbalances were the result of 
a vicious cycle going from deficits to debt levels, then to interest payments, to go 
back to the deficit again. In 1993, a policy shift put the foundations for a radical 
consolidation programme. However, such rising deficit path was only reversed 
after 1995, when it peaked at 6.6% of GDP. 
 
Figure 6: Fiscal stance and real interest rates in Spain and the euro area, 
1977-2005 
Source: AMECO
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The need to fulfil the Maastricht criteria to participate in the euro in 1999 
contributed positively to the fiscal consolidation process and a balanced budget in 
nominal terms was reached in 2002. Unlike in the eighties, the fiscal consolidation 
carried out in the nineties was based on expenditure restraint, significantly 
underpinned by falling interest payments brought about by the price stability-
oriented common monetary policy. In particular, the budgetary position has 
improved further during the 2001-2003 recession. This departs significantly from 
previous recessions as well as from the path followed by several euro area 
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members, notable the largest ones in the early 2000s. Furthermore, the slightly 
tight fiscal stance is not foreseen to change significantly in the near future, while 
the loose monetary conditions are expected to remain. The role played by 
macroeconomic policies is the focus of chapter 3.  
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Part I: Overall macroeconomic performance and 
economic policies 
 
 
The growth differential between Spain and the euro area has been steadily 
widening and reached 2 percentage points in 2003. Moreover, in sharp contrast 
with previous downturns, the slowdown starting in 2001 was much milder and 
shorter in Spain than in the largest economies of the euro area. Higher growth has 
largely relied on buoyant domestic demand, whereas the contribution of the 
external sector to GDP growth has been negative. On the basis of the most recent 
data available (2004), it appears that such an imbalance is becoming larger and 
larger. This raises serious concerns on the sustainability of the Spanish growth 
model in EMU. 
 
Low interest rates brought about by EMU membership coupled with high 
inflation, have resulted in relatively loose monetary conditions in Spain. 
Specifically, real interest rates are actually negative for a number of maturities, 
which has triggered some components of domestic demand, namely investment in 
dwellings. However, the fiscal stance has been tight. The last decade has been 
characterised by an unprecedented consolidation process that reverted a deficit of 
6.6% of GDP in 1995 to a surplus of 0.4% of GDP in 2003.  
 
This part spells out the most salient features of the Spanish growth model. Special 
attention is paid in chapter 2 to the imbalances and risks on the demand side that 
may challenge real convergence. Chapter 3 analyses the extent to which 
macroeconomic policies help explain high economic performance.            
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 2. Demand and output 
  
 
High GDP growth and job creation in Spain has been underpinned by domestic 
demand, in particular consumption, both private and public, and construction. 
Although equipment investment grew strongly during the second part of the 
nineties, the 2001-2002 downturn reversed the trend, pushing growth of this 
category of investment into red territory. More than two years later, the recovery 
of investment in equipment is still uncertain. The contribution of the external 
sector to growth has been steadily worsening since the mid-nineties to become 
negative and attain -2 percentage points in 2004. Moreover, the huge increase in 
house prices and large household’s indebtedness leave households highly exposed 
to negative shocks.  
 
This chapter analyses the salient features of growth composition from the demand 
side and identifies main challenges. It appears of paramount importance to 
pursue efforts aiming at promoting competitiveness in order to restore external 
imbalances. Furthermore, attention needs to be drawn to the housing market. 
Specifically, measures should be implemented to contain housing prices and 
indebtedness in order to soften the landing of the sector and avoid painful 
adjustments in the future.  
 
2.1. Demand at a glance 
 
The resilience of domestic demand, especially consumption and construction, has 
been an outstanding characteristic of the Spanish economy since the mid 1990s 
(Table 1). Leaving aside 1996 and 1997, the external sector has contributed 
negatively to growth over the whole period. Its contribution has indeed been 
negative in 2003, and it is also expected to remain so in 2004. This represents a 
clear departure from past upturns, in which the external sector was the main 
driving force boosting economic activity. Between 1982 and 1984, the external 
sector was behind the recovery of activity after the second oil shock, contributing 
to growth with more than 1 percentage point on average per year, while the 
contribution of domestic demand was very low or even negative. In the upturn of 
the early nineties recession (1993-1995), the contribution of the external sector 
was also positive. 
 
Within domestic demand, the positive contribution of equipment in the nineties 
contrasts with the important fall observed in 2001 and 2002. In 2003 the growth 
rate of this item was below a meagre 2% and it still remains relatively sluggish in 
2004, suggesting that the recovery prospects are uncertain. In contrast, private 
consumption and dwellings, which gained momentum rapidly and peaked in 1999, 
have shown a remarkable dynamism also during the 2001-2002 slowdown, 
offsetting the poor performance of equipment and exports (see Figure 7).     
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 Table 1: Composition of growth in Spain, 1995-2005 (annual percentage 
change) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Private consumption 1.7 2.2 3.2 4.4 4.7 4.1 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.2 2.8
Public consumption 2.4 1.3 2.9 3.7 4.2 5.6 3.5 4.1 3.9 4.2 4.1
Gross fixed capital formation 7.7 2.1 5.0 10.0 8.8 5.7 3.0 1.7 3.2 3.3 3.7
           of which construction 6.6 -1.9 2.3 7.8 9.0 6.2 5.3 5.2 4.3 4.2 3.6
           of which equipment 11.3 8.1 10.8 14.5 7.8 4.7 -1.2 -5.4 1.0 1.7 4.2
           of which other investment 6.1 6.1 3.3 8.7 10.3 6.1 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.6
Domestic demand (exc. inv.) 3.1 2.0 3.5 5.5 5.6 4.7 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.3
Change in inventories as % of GDP 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7
Domestic demand 3.1 1.9 3.5 5.7 5.6 4.6 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.4
Exports of goods and services 9.4 10.4 15.3 8.2 7.7 10.1 3.6 1.2 2.6 4.5 5.2
Imports of goods and servicies 11.1 8.0 13.3 13.2 12.6 10.5 3.9 3.1 4.8 7.2 7.3
Gross Domestic Product 2.8 2.4 4.0 4.3 4.2 4.4 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.6
Domestic demand (exc. inv.) 3.1 2.0 3.5 5.4 5.5 4.8 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.4
Change in inventories 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
External balance -0.3 0.5 0.6 -1.3 -1.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8 -1.1 -1.0
Memorandum items:
GDP Euro area 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.6 0.9 0.5 2.1 2.0
Note: 2004 and 2005 correspond to the 2004 Autumn Commission Forecast.
Source: AMECO
Contributions to GDP growth
 
 
 
According to the Commission Autumn 2004 Forecast, these trends are expected to 
continue, leading to an even more unbalanced growth composition. The 
contribution of domestic demand is projected to strengthen, whereas the 
contribution of the net external demand would deteriorate further. Within this 
framework, the relative contribution to GDP growth of the different demand 
components is analysed in the rest of the chapter.  
 
Figure 7: Domestic demand components (contributions to growth), 1995-2005 
Source: AMECO
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 Box 1: What do Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain have in common? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Overall, similar developments observed in key economic variables in these four are difficult to
attribute in full to their common nature of catching-up economies. 
 
Although in the four economies, traditionally known as cohesion countries, average growth has
been higher than in the euro area since the mid-nineties, only Ireland grew at rates high enough
as to surpass the average income per capita of the EU. During most of the period, Portugal,
Greece and Spain grew at comparable rates, but well below those of Ireland. However, after
the slowdown of 2001, Portugal entered into a deep recession, while the other three cohesion
countries kept growing at more than 3%. A large part of such growth developments can be
associated with mirroring developments in the investment ratio.  
 
Economic developments in non-core economies  
Source: AMECO
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 The four peripheral economies are also characterised by high, albeit decreasing, saving ratios, 
which are converging below 20%, while, ten years ago, private savings were close to 25%. The 
exception is Ireland, where large FDI inflows largely compensated a lower savings ratio. All in 
all, it appears that EMU membership has induced positive wealth effects, according to which, 
agents have considered lower interest rates as a permanent characteristic of their economies. 
Reflecting the fiscal efforts to qualify for EMU, public savings recorded an unambiguous 
upwards path until 2000. After the last slowdown only the Spanish and, to a lesser extent, the 
Irish governments kept improving public balances.  In Greece and Portugal, the trend was 
partially reversed and public savings are now negative. Net exports of goods and services do 
not show many common features. While high net exports in Ireland are a direct consequence of 
foreign investments with a clear export vocation, a steady deterioration of the commercial 
balance is recorded in Spain. In Greece and Portugal, total trade deficits, seem to be permanent 
and stable at 5%.  Therefore, where the external sector is concerned, no clear common paths 
are detected in the four economies. On the one hand, large FDI flows to export-oriented 
activities in Ireland have resulted in a very high and almost permanent trade surplus, while in 
Portugal and Greece capital inflows are financing the deficits in these small and open 
economies. On the other hand, in Spain, a relatively large economy, and thus less open, 
increasing trade deficits are meeting more and more difficulties to be financed by the currently 
diminishing capital inflows.          
 
The EMU effects are evident in the evolution of prices. Falling inflation rates is a characteristic 
of the first part of the period not only in the four peripheral economies but also in many other 
Member States. However, in the second part of the period, has and in spite the price-stability 
oriented monetary policy conducted by the ECB, inflation actually rose in the four cohesion 
countries. Although higher inflation in peripheral economies is usually associated to their 
nature of catching-up economies, as shown in the particular case of Spain, higher inflation may 
not be a result of higher potential growth but of pervasive structural factors.
2.2. Consumption 
 
From a mere 1% in 1995, private consumption grew in real terms by more than 
4% per year on average between 1998 and 2000 (peaking at 4.7% in 1999). After 
decelerating to slightly below 3% between 2001 and 2003, private consumption is 
expected to keep momentum in the short term. Loose monetary conditions and 
positive agents’ expectations linked to higher macroeconomic stability provided 
by EMU have supported buoyant private consumption between 1997 and 2000, 
and contributed to its resilience in 2001 and beyond. Moreover, the personal 
income tax reforms implemented in 1998 and 20032, by reducing tax rates, 
provided additional stimulus through their positive effect on permanent income. 
Last but not least, the dynamism of the labour market, coupled with high 
immigrant flows, which have led employment to grow above 3.5% until 2000, and 
around 2% on average in the period 2001-2003, are paramount to explain the 
strength of consumption during the past slowdown. 
 
Strong private consumption growth was supported by shrinking savings, which 
reached historical lows: The households’ saving ratio went down below 11% of 
Gross Disposable Income (GDI) in 2002. This represents a fall of nearly 5 
percentage points since 1995. It would seem that the sharp decline in interest rates 
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2 Next chapter analyses in detail these tax reforms. 
brought about by EMU in the second half of the nineties was perceived by private 
agents as an increase in permanent income, which boosted borrowing and 
favoured a rapid increase of indebtedness by households and non-financial 
corporations. Therefore, a significant part of the reduction of the saving ratio 
might be permanent because EMU is expected to ensure a sounder 
macroeconomic framework, with low and stable interest rates, which would 
reduce the needs for precautionary saving. In this vein, a more stable framework 
should promote faster growth and higher permanent income, leading to higher 
present consumption. Accordingly, although the reduction of the households’ 
saving ratio has been a common phenomenon in Europe, the ratio in Spain has not 
only been lower than in the euro area but the gap has widened since 2000 (see 
Figure 8). This seems consistent with an increase of the expected permanent 
income in Spain higher than in the euro area average. 
 
The public sector has also contributed to keep total consumption on a sustained 
growth path. Public consumption has been growing above GDP since 2000. As a 
result, its contribution to real GDP growth has been close to one percentage point 
in some years (Figure 7). As discussed in the next chapter, the expansion of public 
consumption was more than offset by the buoyant tax proceeds stemming from 
robust GDP, high employment growth and lower interest burden of government 
debt, thus leading to a concomitant increase of public saving. 
 
Figure 8: Households’ saving ratio (% of gross disposable income) 
Source: AMECO
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The steady fall of the private saving ratio has been offset by growing public 
saving, leaving the total saving ratio barely changed3. This redistribution of 
national savings in Spain since the mid nineties differs sharply from that observed 
in most Member States. Growing public deficits in the euro area were only 
                                                 
3 According to figure 9, the total saving ratio in Spain does not seem to be a matter of concern, but 
only for the moment. Additional cuts in the private saving ratio would further deteriorate the 
current account balance, which should be compensated by higher public surpluses. However, this 
would conflict with other objectives, given the current necessity of structural policies (see Part II). 
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partially offset by a recovery of private saving (Figure 9), entailing a gradual 
deterioration of the total saving ratio since 1998. 
 
Figure 9: Private and public saving as percentage of GDP. Spain and the 
euro area, 1995-2005 
Source: AMECO 
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2.3. Construction and the housing market 
 
Construction activity fell in 1996 by 1.9% in real terms and remained subdued in 
1997 to clearly recover in 1998 (Table 1). Since then, this sector seems to be 
experiencing a sort of golden age, with growth rates close to or well beyond 4%. 
With contributions to output growth ranging between 0.5 and 1 percentage points, 
construction is, together with consumption, the main factor behind the resilience 
of economic activity during the past slowdown (Figure 7). Construction accounts 
for more than 8% of total gross value added in Spain, which compares with 6% in 
the euro area. Moreover, between 2000 and 2003, 40% of new housing in the EU 
was built up in Spain. 
 
Developments in this sector largely depend on public investment in 
infrastructures, which in turn, are very much determined by the electoral cycle and 
usually instrumental to facilitate fiscal adjustment in recessions without incurring 
in significant political costs. Spain, where public works account for nearly 30% of 
total construction, is not an exception to such rules (see Argimón et. al., 1999). 
Public investment was to a certain extent behind the relatively poor performance 
of the construction sector during the early phases of fiscal consolidation in Spain 
over 1996-1997. However, the roots of the recovery of dwellings from 1998 
onwards have to be found in residential construction, rather than in public 
infrastructure expenditure, the share of which in GDP has remained relative stable 
since that year.  
 
The spectacular expansion of residential construction has its roots in strong 
demand. Since 1999, new housing supply has been growing by more than 500,000 
 15
housing starts per year, compared with 250,000 to 300,000 starts in the previous 
period. Additionally, more than 50% of the recent increase in the housing stock 
corresponds to first residences.  
 
The dynamism exhibited by housing demand stems from the concurrence of 
several factors, including historically low interest rates following EMU 
membership, strong job creation and the sharp increase in female employment, the 
favourable fiscal treatment of housing acquisition, which contrasts with the scant 
development of the renting market4, high migration flows, adding to the baby 
boom generation participating in the labour market, and the poor performance of 
the stock-market since 2000 that made of dwellings an attractive investment. In 
addition, EMU membership has eliminated exchange rate uncertainties, which has 
boosted acquisitions by foreigners, mainly from the EU (see section 2.5).  
 
As a result, housing prices multiplied by more than 2 since the mid 1990s, much 
more than construction costs (Figure 10). Households’ indebtedness also more 
than doubled and now represents around 100% of GDI. However, although lower 
interest rates and longer maturity of mortgages led the financial charge, as a 
percentage of GDI, to increase only moderately, the current situation is not free of 
risks. Growing indebtedness leaves households exposed to less favourable 
economic developments. In particular, unexpected upward interest rate 
movements may have a sizeable impact on the financial burden of mortgages and 
thus on consumption through a negative income effect. 
 
However, such upside risks are unlikely to lead to a sharp correction of housing 
prices since, on the one hand, even if interest rates rise in the short term, they are 
expected to remain moderate by historical standards, and, on the other hand, the 
elements sustaining housing demand are not expected to fade away in the near 
future (Box 2).  
 
Figure 10: Housing prices and construction costs (annual % change) 
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Source: Ministerio de la Vivienda5 
                                                 
4   García-Montalvo (2003). 
5 http://www.igsap.map.es/cia/agenda/mviv.htm  
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 The evolution of housing prices in Spain has raised concerns on the possible existence of a
speculative bubble in the housing market and on the consequences on consumption and
financial stability stemming from an abrupt price correction (useful references for housing
bubbles are Hendershott, 2000, and Bourassa, 2001). Some international economic institutions
(OECD, 2004 and ECB, 2004) and analysts (The Economist, 2004) have warned about the
increasing risk of a sudden price adjustment given that current prices would be above
equilibrium levels. Empirical research in this respect is, however, not conclusive. Ayuso and
Restoy (2003) point out that price-to-rent ratios are at around 20% above the equilibrium
values as a result of both supply constraints and demand shocks stemming from interest rate
movements and higher labour market participation. Similarly, Balmaseda, San Martín and
Sebastián (2002) estimate that housing prices in the period 1999-2002 are 28% overvalued.  
 
On the other hand, Martínez-Pagés and Maza (2003) find that loosening credit constraints and
falling nominal interest rates are the key explanatory factors for the boom of housing. They
obtain evidence of overvaluation under two alternative models, and conclude that, although a
correction in real terms can be expected, it should not be necessarily sharper than in previous
episodes. Finally, Béranger (2004) does not find evidence of speculative bubbles but stresses
the risks linked to the high households’ indebtedness and the likely adverse wealth effects
through higher interest rates. 
 
Some structural elements from the supply side seem to be also partially responsible for the
developments observed in the housing market (see Martínez Pagés and Maza, 2003). The
scarcity of land in some urban areas along with land regulations implemented by local
authorities in order to collect revenues from taxation on land may have contributed to boost
prices since the mid 1990s. For instance, in Madrid the cost of land as a percentage of final
housing prices is above 60% compared to nearly 40% in 1995. In this respect, García Montalvo
(2003) stresses that land prices are a consequence of housing prices rather than a cause (land
prices are set depending on expected housing prices). Therefore, a greater flexibility of current
regulations allowing for higher supply of land can not represent in itself a “miracle” damping
down housing price increases. onsequently, there seems to be some room for public action to lower housing 
rice pressures, without provoking a hard landing in the housing market. Among 
he proposals put forward by different commentators, three appear particularly 
nteresting: first, a more neutral fiscal treatment between housing acquisition and 
etting6; second, a better and more flexible regulation of the rental market aiming 
t ensuring higher protection to owners’ rights, and, third a greater transparency 
nd flexibility in land regulations, which by enhancing housing supply would also 
ase price tensions in the medium-term. 
eaving aside the risks associated with imbalances in the housing sector (see Box 
), an excessive development of the housing sector may also have structural 
mplications for the Spanish economy.  While investment in infrastructures 
nvolves clear positive spillovers on productivity in other sectors, residential 
                                                
 However, tax incentives on housing acquisition cannot be blamed for such increase in housing 
rices. In fact, these incentives were already in place well before the housing boom started. It 
ould rather seem that the fall of interest rates triggered demand for housing.  
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construction is unlikely to provide the adequate foundations to maintain growth in 
the long run. Real convergence and sustainable long-term growth require re-
conducting financial resources to other activities with higher impact on 
productivity growth, for which a recovery of investment in equipment appears 
essential.  
 
It might be argued that a financial crisis would be one risks associated with an 
excessive indebtedness. Unfavourable events leading to interest rate rises could 
bring about difficulties in debt servicing, which, the argument would go on, might 
result in a deterioration of balance sheets of banks. However, this does not seem a 
likely outcome in the case of Spain, where financial corporations enjoy a healthy 
position due to exigent reserve requirements. Nevertheless, credit contention 
associated with deteriorating balance sheets of financial institutions could affect 
consumption and investment. 
 
2.4. Equipment 
 
After falling markedly by nearly 20% in 1993, investment in equipment recovered 
strength in the second half of the 1990s and peaked in 1998, when it grew by 
14%. Since then, equipment growth slipped into a decelerating path and became 
negative in 2001 and 2002, declining by almost 5.5%. In 2003, it grew  by 1% 
pointing to a very limited recovery. As a result, investment in equipment as a 
percentage of GDP declined from close to 8% in 1999 to below 7% in 2003, 
which contrasts with the growing share registered by construction in the same 
period (from around 13% to nearly 14%).  
 
Unlike construction, equipment in Spain follows a cycle in synchrony with that 
observed in other euro area partners and appears more linked to developments in 
the external sector rather than to domestic demand conditions (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Equipment, exports of goods and domestic demand, 1991-2005. 
(real annual % change) 
Source: AMECO
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Fluctuations in equipment investment over the cycle are closely related to 
capacity utilisation and profitability, especially in capital-intensive sectors such as 
manufacturing. In particular, Spanish companies in the last years have shown 
healthy profitability sustained by falling financial charges, while unit labour costs 
have been growing below the GDP deflator. These elements along with a higher 
capacity utilisation stemming from the current economic recovery should boost 
investment in equipment, which seems paramount in order to improve the poor 
developments recorded by labour productivity growth, in particular total factor 
productivity. 
 
However, such prospects might turn out too optimistic because of the close link 
between investment in equipment and the exporting manufacturing sector. 
Specifically, cost competitiveness losses registered in the last decade have 
resulted in narrowing margins for Spanish manufacturing firms so as to preserve 
their external market shares. Persistent margin shrinkage may end up by affecting 
profit rates in manufacturing relative to other less capital intensive sectors. As a 
matter of fact, price moderation in manufacturing has come hand in hand with 
growing real unit labour costs, which is in sharp contrast with the continuous drop 
in RULC for the rest of the economy and departs from euro area trends (see 
chapter 6 for the details)7. In the medium term, these elements might constitute a 
weak incentive for investment in manufacturing, which is the activity branch more 
inclined to innovation.  
 
2.5. The external sector 
 
Trade deficits, which have been a constant of the Spanish economy since the end 
of the autarky, have gained momentum to reach 5-6% of GDP since 1999, and net 
imports growth has remained buoyant in the slowdown (see Table 2). In contrast, 
the surpluses recorded by the balance of services, which, mainly through tourist 
revenues traditionally finances the external balance, have not kept pace. Only 
during the period 1996-1998 the service surplus made up for the trade deficit.  
 
The primary incomes balance, which basically records the remuneration of 
foreign capitals, is also negative, as would be expected in a country that has been 
receiving large foreign capital inflows and has widespread presence of 
multinational companies. This deficit, historically accounting for around 1% of 
GDP, seems to be gaining pace in the latest years, although a moderation 
underpinned by the remuneration of increasing Spanish direct investment abroad 
should not be excluded in the future. 
 
From a historical perspective, current transfers balance has also contributed to 
reduce the external deficit, although much less than services. The main source of 
                                                 
7 While real unit labour costs for manufacturing in Spain grew by 1.1% in the period 1996-2003 (a 
fall of 0.5% in the euro area), they dropped by 0.5% for the whole economy in the same period 
(-0.4% in the euro area). 
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this item was income inflows sent by Spanish emigrant workers. However, since 
the mid eighties such inflows have been fading out, although compensated by EU 
funds, notably European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGGF section 
guarantee). However, in the most recent past, Spain has become a net receptor of 
immigrants, the financial outflows of whom, along with the progressive reduction 
of EU funds, are expected to worsen this balance in the coming years.  
 
The resulting current account balance has worsened systematically since 1998, 
while the capital balance, which is positive and mainly comes from EU capital 
transfers8, only amounts to 1% of GDP, clearly insufficient to offset such figures. 
As a result, the previous net lending position of the Spanish economy has turned 
into a net borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the world since 1999.  
 
Table 2: Balance of Payments as % of GDP, 1995-2005 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Exports of goods 16.0 16.8 19.0 19.1 18.8 20.7 20.2 19.5 18.9 18.9 19.1
Imports of goods 19.1 19.5 21.5 22.6 23.8 26.9 25.9 24.6 24.2 24.8 25.5
Trade balance
Exports of services 6.6 7.1 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.4 9.7 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.4
Imports of services 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.6
Services balance 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.1 2.8
External balance of goods and services 0.5 1.0 0.1
Balance of Primary Incomes w/ROW
Balance of Current Transfers w/ROW 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Balance of current transactions w/ROW 0.1 0.4
Balance of capital transactions w/ROW 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
Net Lending (+)/ Net Borrowing of the Economy 1.0 1.2 1.5 0.2
Note: 2004 and 2005 correspond to the 2004 Autumn Commission Forecast.
Source: AMECO  
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-1.0 -2.5 -2.2 -1.6 -2.1 -2.9 -3.6 
 
 
Although recent past figures of the external balance are not exceptional by 
historical standards, the current net borrowing position of the Spanish economy is 
especially worrisome because some of the instruments traditionally applied to 
compensating imbalances are not available now, whereas the net borrowing bias 
remains chronicle.  
 
Adjustment policies based on imports cuts through tariff protection are excluded. 
Additionally, recourse to the exchange rate to compensate for competitiveness 
losses is not possible since the rate was fixed after 1999 Spain accession to EMU. 
Finally, while trade deficits remain of a structural nature, policies should turn to 
long term reforms, mainly supply side oriented (see Chapter 5 and 6), without 
which the external sector may face tensions that might eventually translate into 
price moderation and unemployment. 
 
Since accession to the EU, red numbers were financed by foreign direct 
investment flows (FDI henceforth), which attained 2% of GDP in the early 
nineties and accounted for almost 9% of the total gross fixed capital formation. 
                                                 
8 Mainly European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF section guidance) and 
Fund for Regional Development (FRD). 
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Before 1986, FDI inflows represented on average only 0.5 percentage points of 
GDP (Fernández-Otheo, 2003). All in all, FDI flows in the second half of the 
eighties might have been partly responsible for the 7 point increase in the 
investment ratio observed in that period9.  
 
 Interestingly, the traditional net recipient position of Spain in relation to FDI has 
reverted since 1997. This has been caused by the growing presence of Spanish 
companies overseas, which largely concentrate on a few sectors and big 
companies, namely energy, telecommunications and banking, whose final 
destination is Latin America. This implies a high exposure of Spanish investment 
abroad to both sectoral and country-specific shocks.   
 
Although from 1997 to 2000 FDI inflows grew sharply, 2003 registered a fall of 
€ 16.5 billion. This fall was worldwide spread, and Spain was relatively less 
affected than other economies10. However, a growing share of FDI inflows is 
allocated to real estate (32% in 2003) as opposed to more productive and 
productivity-enhancing activities. Moreover, investment inflows in sectors with 
high technological content represented in the late 1990s and the early 2000s only 
at around 10% of total FDI (see Muñoz Guarasa, 2002).     
 
Some other factors risk further worsening the external position of Spain. 
Specifically, the fading away of EU funds11 by 2006, as well as a potential 
moderation of revenues from tourism (see Chapter 6) might imply growing 
difficulties in order to finance external deficits.  
                                                 
9 Although the establishment of new companies has also implied additional investment projects, 
FDI flows cannot be fully assimilated to gross fixed capital formation since a part of them can  
merely consist of equity purchases.   
10 Actually in 2003 Spain jumped from the eight to the sixth position as FDI receptor. 
11 Overall, net transfers from EU represent around 1.2% of GDP per year (see next chapter). 
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3.  Macroeconomic policies 
 
 
 
This chapter assesses the role played by macroeconomic policies in the 
broadening of the growth differential of Spain vis-à-vis the euro area. A first 
element to be considered refers to the monetary policy stance. A second element 
deals with the process of fiscal consolidation registered in Spain and the extent to 
which fiscal retrenchment had a positive impact on activity. In particular, it seems 
relevant to review fiscal consolidation in Spain since 1996, and to assess the role 
played by tax reforms and budgetary institutions. Under a long-term perspective, 
sustainability issues are also considered.  
 
The main feature of the period 1996-2003 is the achievement of a successful fiscal 
consolidation process, which translated into a drastic reduction of the debt ratio. 
During these years, no evidence of a marked growth contraction brought by the 
fiscal retrenchment can be identified. Although non-fiscal factors, especially 
monetary conditions, have also played an important role, positive effects on 
economic activity stemming from the fiscal consolidation should not be 
disregarded. In this respect, by helping ensure the sustainability of public 
finances, fiscal consolidation in Spain might have improved long-run growth 
prospects.  
 
Moreover, the 1998 and 2000 tax reforms may have also contributed positively to 
growth and employment without jeopardising fiscal consolidation. In addition, 
strong economic activity coupled with buoyant job creation would have led to a 
much lower than expected loss of revenues. 
 
As regards budgetary institutions, the rules and procedures set in the current 
GLBS are tighter than the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact and 
ensure fiscal discipline at all levels of government. By taking a longer perspective, 
and in order to maintain sound fiscal finances, spending ceilings may be needed 
to avoid future tax increases, in particular in the light of the budgetary costs 
associated to ageing. In this context, given the relatively high decentralisation of 
the budget process in Spain, the reform of the General Law of Budgetary Stability, 
unless rigorously applied over the cycle, might lead to a looser spending control 
and higher deficits, mainly at the regional level. 
 
Given the uncertainty over future demographic trends and the effects of 
productivity growth on the average pension benefit, the possibility of large fiscal 
imbalances stemming from pension expenditure over the next decades cannot be 
ruled out. The measures adopted so far in order to increase labour market 
participation, to reduce public debt, and to build up a reserve fund should be 
complemented with a reform of the key parameters of the pension system, such as 
the number of contributory years, the retirement age and the replacement ratio. 
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3.1. A tale of a successful consolidation? 
 
Fiscal consolidation has left behind the age of high deficits and debt accumulation 
in Spain. Partly fostered by the need to fulfil the Maastricht criteria12 to join EMU 
in 1998, the public deficit, which had peaked to 6.6% of GDP in 1995, began 
shrinking gradually from 1996 onwards to almost reach a balanced budget in 2002 
(-0.1% of GDP) and to register a surplus of 0.4% the year after (Figure 12).  
 
According to the changes recorded by the cyclically-adjusted balance (CAB), the 
deficit reduction has been to a large extent discretionary (Figure 12). While fiscal 
tightening was a common feature in most euro area countries until 1999, in Spain 
the process was slightly more acute. Moreover, as from 2001 the CABs clearly 
display very different policy stances in Spain and the euro area. Actually, the 
consolidation process was reverted in the latter when recession showed up: 
expenditures rebounded (Figure 13) and revenues accelerated their declining path. 
According to Commission Autumn 2004 forecasts, Spain will record a transitory 
deterioration of the general government balances in 2004, mainly due to the 
effects of some statistical reclassifications, whereas the situation is not foreseen to 
improve in the euro area.  
 
Figure 12: General Government balance (as % of GDP), 1995-2005 
Source: AMECO
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Where the composition of the adjustment is concerned, consolidation was mainly 
based on spending retrenchment, although revenues also grew with respect to 
GDP. Between 1995 and 2003 the share of government expenditures in GDP fell 
by around 5.4 percentage points, while the share of revenues increased by 1.6 
percentage points. In spite of such a combination of higher revenues and lower 
spending, fiscal consolidation in Spain does not appear to follow a switching 
strategy’. One main characteristic of such switching strategies is that revenues are 
                                                 
12 The Maastricht criteria were set on a ESA-79 basis. The figures provided in this chapter 
correspond to the ESA-95 methodology. 
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raised in the first place and, then, spending is cut (European Commission, 2000)13. 
However, the bulk of the adjustment in Spain took place on the expenditure side, 
while some taxes were actually cut and tax revenues largely increased through the 
automatic stabilising effects of high growth. 
 
Figure 13: Total public expenditure (as % of GDP), 1995-2005 
Source: AMECO
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Regarding expenditures, two different periods can be distinguished (Table 3). 
Between 1995 and 1999 total expenditures fell by 4.8 percentage points of GDP. 
The bulk of this reduction was almost equally shared by interest payments (1.7 
p.p.), social benefits (1.5 p.p.) and capital expenditure (1.4 p.p.). While the 
progressive rein on inflation allowed for a steady fall in interest rates, which, in 
turn, lowered the debt burden, the acceleration of economic activity and a higher 
job content of growth alleviated the pressure on social benefits. In parallel, total 
capital expenditure fell from 6.2% in 1995 to 4.8% of GDP in 1999. The burden 
of this adjustment in the second half of the nineties mainly fell on capital transfers 
(1.4% of GDP), while public investment was lowered by only 0.4 percentage 
points of GDP, from 3.7% in 1995 to 3.4% in 1999. 
 
Between 2000 and 2003, total expenditures were only reduced by half a point of 
GDP. Although interest payments, driven by lower interest rates and debt stock, 
followed the previous downward path, no other spending item recorded a 
significant reduction, while government final consumption gained momentum to 
reach in 2003 the weight recorded previously in 1996 (17.9 percentage points). As 
a matter of fact, from 2000 onwards the fiscal adjustment in Spain faded out due 
to the so-called “Maastricht fatigue” that was also suffered, albeit with different 
intensity, by most of the European economies (see González-Páramo, 2001). 
 
 
                                                 
13 See also Buti, et al. (1998). In addition, von Hagen et al. (2001) point out that switching 
strategies are due to the ineffectiveness of revenue-based adjustments to achieve successful 
consolidations (see box 2).   
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Table 3: General government accounts (% of GDP), 1995-2005 
Average Average
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 95-99 00-03
INDIRECT TAXES 10.2 10.2 10.5 11.1 11.7 11.7 11.4 11.6 12.0 12.0 12.2 10.7 11.7
DIRECT TAXES 10.1 10.3 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.5 10.4 10.9 10.6 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.6
       Of which paid by households 8.2 8.2 7.7 7.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.7 7.2
SOCIAL  CONTRIBUTIONS 13.0 13.2 13.1 13.0 13.1 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.1 13.5
OTHER CURRENT RESOURCES 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.9 3.4
(1) TOTAL CURRENT RESOURCES 37.4 37.8 38.0 38.0 38.6 38.8 38.9 39.4 39.6 39.5 39.6 38.0 39.2
TOTAL CAPITAL RESOURCES 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.7
TOTAL RESOURCES 38.4 38.8 38.6 38.3 39.0 39.1 39.2 39.8 40.0 39.9 40.0 38.6 39.5
SUBSIDIES 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2
SOCIAL BENEFITS 13.9 13.8 13.3 12.8 12.4 12.3 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.3 12.3 13.2 12.2
INTEREST PAYMENTS 5.2 5.3 4.8 4.3 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 4.6 3.0
GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION 18.1 17.9 17.5 17.5 17.4 17.7 17.6 17.7 17.9 18.0 18.1 17.7 17.7
OTHER CURRENT EXPENDITURE 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.2
(2) TOTAL CURRENT EXPENDITURE 39.2 39.1 37.6 36.8 35.8 35.7 35.2 35.3 35.2 35.4 35.4 37.7 35.3
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 3.7 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.3
TOTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 6.2 5.1 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.0 4.8 5.5 5.0 5.1 4.8
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 45.0 43.7 41.8 41.4 40.2 40.0 39.6 39.9 39.6 40.4 40.1 42.4 39.8
GROSS SAVING (1-2) -1.8 -1.2 0.4 1.2 2.9 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.1 4.2 0.3 3.8
PRIMARY BALANCE -1.4 0.4 1.6 1.2 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.9 1.7 2.1 0.8 2.7
NET CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 4.8 3.7 3.6 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.7 4.2 4.1 4.1
NET LENDING (+) OR NET BORROWING (-) -6.6 -5.0 -3.2 -3.0 -1.2 -0.9 -0.4 -0.1 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 -3.8 -0.3
Net Lending(+) or Net Borrowing (-) before RTVE reclassification -0.8 -0.3 0.0
Tax Burden 33.4 33.8 34.2 34.5 35.1 35.6 35.4 36.1 36.3 36.1 36.2 34.2 35.8
GENERAL GOVERNMENT GROSS DEBT 63.9 68.1 66.6 64.6 63.1 61.1 57.5 54.4 50.7 48.2 45.5 65.3 55.9
(f) Forecast
Source: IGAE  
 
In contrast, total revenues have been steadily increasing since 1995, when they 
were at 38.4% of GDP, to reach 40% in 2003. While capital revenues fell by 0.6 
% of GDP, current receipts jumped by 2.2 percentage points, from 37.4% in 1995 
to 39.6% in 2003. The bulk of this increase is attributable to higher indirect taxes 
(by 1.8 percentage points), particularly VAT, as well as to higher revenues from 
social contributions (0.7% of GDP). Such additional revenues partially financed 
the reform of the personal income tax, which lowered direct taxes paid by 
households by 1% of GDP. 
 
 
Box 3: Factors conditioning the success of budgetary retrenchments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There has been a fruitful debate in the literature on the factors conditioning the success of
fiscal consolidation programmes. Firstly, the size of the adjustment is a question of major
importance. If a sizeable consolidation effort is made, it may avoid the necessity of even more
painful adjustments in the future, which translates into higher permanent income because
consumers anticipate lower taxes. In addition, fiscal consolidations, by reducing risk premia,
lead to lower interest rates and higher wealth. These factors, coupled with higher credibility of
fiscal policy, help boost consumption. Thus, if initial imbalances are sizeable and public
finances are unsustainable, the larger the adjustment to bring public finances back to a
sustainable path, the larger the benefits derived from the adjustment. These positive effects
might even offset the direct contractionary impact of the fiscal retrenchment, giving rise to the
appearance of the so-called “non-Keynesian” effects of fiscal policy (see, for instance, Alesina
and Perotti, 1995, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996, Alesina et al., 1999, Giavazzi, Jappelli and
Pagano, 2000, or Von Hagen et al., 2001. De Castro, 2003a, 2003b, offers some empirical
evidence for Spain). Moreover, Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Perotti (1999) find such
effects on growth are more likely to occur in countries and periods where debt ratios are high. 
 
On the other hand, fiscal consolidations are considered to enjoy a higher probability of success
and entail more beneficial effects provided they are expenditure-based, mainly if they rely on
current transfers and public wage expenditures. Accordingly, cuts in wage expenditure could
ease wage pressure in the private sector, increasing the profitability of investment and the
positive response of GDP (Alesina et al., 1999 and Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, among others). 25
The consolidation process had a positive effect on primary balances and on debt 
reduction. While primary balances had been in the red up to 1995, the trend was 
reversed in 1996 when the nominal deficit (5.0%) fell below interest payments 
(at 5.3% of GDP). Since then, primary surpluses have steadily increased to reach 
figures close to 3% between 2001 and 2003. Consequently, between 1996, when 
the debt ratio peaked at 68%, and 2003 gross debt has fallen by more than 17 
percentage points of GDP to attain 50.7% of GDP (see Figure 14). According to 
the Commission Autumn 2004 forecast, the debt ratio is projected to further fall to 
around 45% in 2005. 
 
Figure 14: General government debt ratio in Spain and the euro-area, 
1995-2005 
Source: AMECO
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Albeit significant, the contribution of the primary balance to the debt ratio 
reduction has been outpaced by that of nominal growth even during the recent 
slowdown (see box 4), when the GDP deflator peaked above 4% (see table 4). In 
parallel, the contribution of interest payments to the stock of debt has followed a 
decreasing path since 1995. 
 
Table 4: Decomposition of changes in the public debt ratio (as % of GDP) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Level of government debt 68.1 66.6 64.6 63.1 61.1 57.5 54.4 50.7
Change in government debt ratio: 4.2 -1.5 -2.0 -1.4 -2.0 -3.6 -3.1 -3.7 
• Contribution of primary balance -0.4 -1.6 -1.2 -2.4 -2.4 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9 
• GDP growth contribution -3.6 -4.1 -4.3 -4.3 -4.7 -4.1 -3.7 -3.4 
• Contribution of interest payments 5.3 4.8 4.3 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.5
• Stock-flow adjustment (residual) 2.9 -0.6 -0.8 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.6 0.0
Pro Memoria: official figures before RTVE reclassification
    Level of government debt 60.5 56.8 53.8
Stock-flow adjustment (residual) 1.2 0.0 0.6
Note:The decomposition of changes in the gross debt ratio is based on the following equation for the budget constraint:
with: Dt = government debt; PDt = primary deficit; Yt = GDP at current prices; yt = nominal GDP growth rate;                    
i = implicit interest rate; SFt = “stock-flow adjustment”.
Yt
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Box 4: Fiscal targets and overestimated growth. Spain 2001-2003 
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 One feature of the fiscal consolidation process in Spain has drawn analysts’ attention: while
real output growth has been in the most recent years worse than official forecasts, the fiscal
targets have generally been overachieved.  
 
The main causes behind such an apparent contradiction are the following: 
 
• Lower real GDP growth was accompanied by higher inflation, which pushed nominal
GDP up. This implied higher nominal revenues since no tariff updates were carried
out. 
• Employment growth remained strong and no large deviations from official forecasts
were registered. This contributed to the growth of the tax base and resulted in healthy
revenue growth. 
• Strong domestic demand helped sustain indirect tax collection.  
• An excessively prudent budgetary objective setting. As indicated in the Council
opinion on the assessment of the Updated Stability Programme, Spanish authorities
could have set more ambitious fiscal targets (see Official Journal of the European
Union, 2004). 
For exposition purposes the table below shows the differences in GDP growth rates between
actual and forecast in the corresponding budget laws: 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Real  GDP 0.9 0.4 0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.6
Nominal GDP 1.1 1.1 2.0 1.2 0.7 0.9
he reduction of the debt ratio has gone on steadily throughout the period despite 
inancial operations reflected in positive stock-flow adjustments for some years, 
specially in 1999, 2000 and 2002. Part of such adjustments is capital injections 
rom the general government sector to State-owned entities to finance investment 
rojects. The most important agencies receiving capital injections were:  
) “GIF” (Gestor de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias), for investments in high-speed 
ailway network. Capital injections received by the GIF amounted to around 
 601M, € 901M, € 1202M and € 1268M from 2000 to 2003 respectively 
between 0.10% and 0.17% of GDP). 
i) “Sociedades de Aguas”, to cope with the necessities of water supply (less than 
.1% of GDP).  
ii) Reclassification of the unit RTVE (Radio Televisión Española) from the sector 
non-financial corporations” to the General government sector, which added 
round 0.7 p.p. to the debt ratio in 2000 (see Pro Memoria: official figures before 
TVE reclassification in Table 3). Part of this increase, around 0.5 p.p. of GDP, is 
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due to RTVE cumulated debt, which led to an equivalent increase in the stock-
flow adjustment14.  
 
Moreover, for 2004 an historical debt of € 2.5 billion (0.3%) of the central 
government with Andalusia will be recognised. Such debt stems from the 
liquidation of the financial system for regional governments in the period 1997-
2001. Furthermore, the government has recently announced its intention to 
assume the cumulated debt of the Spanish Railway network corporation (RENFE) 
already in 2004. Such debt amounts to € 7.3 bn., of which € 3.659 bn. (0.47% of 
GDP) correspond to the historical debt and will affect the deficit through capital 
transfers and € 1.8 bn (0.23% of GDP) correspond to the acquisition of RENFE’s 
infrastructure, which increases the deficit through gross fixed capital formation. 
The rest of the debt (€ 1.659 bn or 0.21% of GDP) corresponds to acquisition by 
the new operator company of RENFE’s assets, with no impact on the public 
deficit. These changes do not affect either the deficit of previous years. 
 
To sum up, fiscal consolidation has been supported by healthy growth rates and 
buoyant job creation, especially in the late nineties. In parallel, the sharp fall of 
interest rates reduced the financial charges and helped sustain the decline of 
expenditures in terms of GDP. Expenditure restraint, although sharper at the 
beginning of the period, went on even during the 2001-2002 downturn. The same 
factors, high growth and job creation, coupled with the increase of some indirect 
taxes and excise duties allowed for a smooth and steady increase in the revenues-
to-GDP ratio, even in spite of the income tax reform carried out in 1998 and 2002. 
 
Within this framework, a couple of issues seem relevant at this stage. First, how 
we can characterise the fiscal policy stance in Spain and how it has interacted with 
monetary policies. This is the subject of the next section 3.2. Second, and under a 
longer term perspective, to what extent the current sound position of the Spanish 
public finances, including low debt levels, can be ensured in the future. On the 
one hand, leaving aside the increase in some indirect taxes, the main feature on 
the revenue side has been the reform of income taxes, which, by reducing 
distortions, should have positive effects on potential growth. A detailed analysis 
of this tax reform and its effects is provided in section 3.3. On the other hand, the 
overall increase recorded by tax receipts has a non-negligible cyclical component. 
Therefore, expenditure discipline is needed in order to avoid raising taxes in the 
future. The main features of the Spanish budgetary institutions are analysed in 
section 3.4. Finally, although the drastic reduction of debt levels should have 
relatively long-lasting effects on interest payments, while interest rates are not 
under control of the Spanish authorities, much of the expenditure retrenchment 
has taken place through automatic stabilisers (social benefits) or through the 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that stock-flow adjustment figures not only reflect the effect of “below the 
line” operations, as was the case of RTVE own debt. It also captures pure financial operations, like 
debt issues to cover odd cash needs or strategic debt movements in a context of decreasing interest 
rates, i.e. discretionary debt maturities and interest rates shifts. The latter seems to have been the 
case during some years of the period considered. 
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trimming of capital expenditure, thus leaving untouched much of the factors 
underpinning positive trends of current expenditures. Section 3.5 looks at the long 
term position of public finances in Spain, paying particular attention to the 
pension system. 
 
Box 5: The EU transfers: Did EU help? 
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 The EU transfers have contributed to the performance of the Spanish economy since 1986 and, 
especially, since the mid-nineties. Overall, the positive Spanish balance with the EU averaged 
1.1% of GDP in the period 1996-2003 (see table below). This positive balance has enabled 
Spain to finance its infrastructures, as well as human and knowledge capital. Specifically, the 
Cohesion and Structural Funds, at around 1.1% of GDP on average, allowed for the 
implementation of investment and development projects in Objective 1 regions while 
mitigating substantially their effects on the general government balance.  
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
EAGGF section Guarantee 4054.6 4605.6 5304.6 5243.0 5498.6 6184.5 5959.7 6485.4
Cohesion and Structural Funds 6304.8 6376.8 6825.2 7405.0 5114.7 7141.6 8833.0 9037.6
         EAGGF section Guidance 827.1 858.7 1271.3 297.9 619.4 645.7 810.1
         ERDF 3017.5 2748.7 2732.8 2752.2 4355.4 3964.7 4397.3
         ESF 1151.6 1526.8 1869.4 756.6 1049.0 1922.1 1738.3
         Cohesion Fund 1018.9 1064.3 942.6 1138.1 979.5 2071.8 1724.8
         Other structural funds 361.7 626.7 588.9 169.9 138.3 228.7 367.1
Internal policies 275.6 294.3 294.7 284.9 287.4 290.2 382.5 319.2
Total EU expenditure 10635.0 11276.7 12424.5 12932.9 10900.7 13616.3 15175.2 15842.2
             as % of GDP 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2
Spanish Contribution 4547.2 5367.6 5752.4 6231.4 6445.4 6591.5 6551.1 7429.4
Balance 6087.8 5909.1 6672.1 6701.5 4455.3 7024.8 8624.1 8412.8
             as % of GDP 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
Source: European Commission
 
Measures of the effects of the Cohesion and Structural Funds on economic performance vary 
depending on the methodology employed. Until 2000 they are estimated to have increased 
GDP by at around 1.2% (ESRI, 2002). Regarding their foreseen impact from 2000 to 2006, 
Beutel (2002) obtains an average positive increase of GDP of 1.7%, whereas the MOISEES, 
HERMIN and QUEST II models estimate their impact in 1.0%, 2.1% and 0.6%, respectively. 
Differences in the estimations stem from the different methodologies employed. Thus, while 
Beutel (2002) yields estimations based on input-output tables and accounts basically for 
demand effects, the HERMIN and QUEST II models mainly reflect supply side effects in the 
long term. In addition, one important difference between the HERMIN and QUEST II models 
is that the latter allows for some crowding-out, whereas the former excludes this possibility by 
imposing fixed interest and exchange rates (see European Commission, 2004b, for technical 
details). In any case, the Cohesion and Structural Funds have contributed to increase Spanish 
potential growth. No doubt, Spain wins, but it is not the only one. The whole game is of a win-
win nature, since Spain has also contributed to final demand in other Member States. .2. The policy mix: Enough fiscal tightening?  
 pro-cyclical fiscal loosening, coupled with the failure to achieve close-to-
alance positions when growth conditions were favourable, has led to growing 
iscal imbalances in the euro area in the 2000s (see European Commission, 
003a). This contrasts with the fiscal policy stance in Spain where leaving aside 
998 and 2000 fiscal stance has been tight (see Figure 15). The tightening was 
ro-cyclical between 2001 and 2003, which allowed Spain to achieve small 
udget surpluses in a context of negative output gaps. Although the fiscal stance is 
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expected to transitorily loosen in 2004 (see section 3.1), according to the 
Commission Autumn 2004 forecasts, a pro-cyclical fiscal tightening is expected 
to take place in 2005.   
 
Figure 15: The fiscal stance in Spain and the euro area, 1996-2005 
Source: AMECO
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Monetary policy conducted by the Bank of Spain since the mid-nineties aimed at 
keeping inflation under control with a view to meeting the Maastricht criteria. The 
achievement of historically low inflation rates in 1997 enabled Spain to qualify 
for the adoption of the euro in 1998. In parallel, lower inflation rates allowed for a 
steady reduction of real interest rates, which resulted in loose monetary policies 
between 1996 and 1998. Since then, when monetary policy was transferred to the 
ECB, a single nominal interest rate responding to the euro area average inflation 
has induced further monetary loosening in Spain, which, due to the positive 
inflation differential with the rest of the euro area, enjoys easier monetary 
conditions than other Member States. The only exceptions are 2000 and 2001, 
when the monetary policy stance in Spain was neutral or slightly tight. No doubt 
such monetary conditions have supported consumption and facilitated access to 
credit15. In particular, low interest rates have boosted mortgages and helped 
underpin the boom in the housing market, while contributing to improving 
balance sheets through lower financial costs. Accordingly, monetary policy has 
been especially growth-supportive in Spain since the mid-nineties, but most 
particularly since 1999 (Figure 16). 
 
Overall, it is difficult to assess whether the policy mix has been more 
expansionary in Spain than in the euro area as a whole. For most of the period the 
monetary stance has been more expansionary in Spain than in the euro area. 
However, such loose monetary conditions have been accompanied by a much 
                                                 
15 Domestic credit to corporations, households and non-profit institutions serving households has 
grown between 14% and 18% on the year in the last three years, whereas total domestic credit to 
non-financial sectors including the general government has grown by above 10%.    
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tighter fiscal policy in Spain (see Figure 16). Therefore, the policy mix only 
seems to provide a very partial explanation of the comparative performance of the 
Spanish economy since the mid-nineties. According to the Commission Autumn 
2004 forecasts, a transitory loosening is expected in 2004, while the policy mix 
should slightly tighten. In 2005, however, it is foreseen to tighten somehow.  
 
At this passage of the Spanish consolidation tale, natural question emerges: Is 
there enough fiscal tightening? With credit growing above 15%, coupled with 
high households’ indebtedness and a large and persistent inflation differential, 
risks seem to be on the downside. With a view to preventing economic 
imbalances, in particular overheating, from deepening further, fiscal policy should 
be tightened.  
 
Figure 16: The policy mix in Spain and the euro area, 1996-2005 
Source: AMECO
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3.3. Consolidating tax-cuts?  
 
In 1998 an in depth reformulation of the personal income tax was implemented. A 
second amendment, in 2002, was a step further in the same direction. Both steps 
aimed at simplifying the income tax structure16 while providing incentives for 
labour force participation and saving. The main features of these reforms can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
• The maximum and minimum marginal rates were lowered significantly while 
the number of tax brackets was considerably reduced (see Table 5). The 
maximum tax rate fell from 56% to 45% and the number of tax brackets from 
16 to 5. 
                                                 
16 Nevertheless, a lot of amendments for specific cases are introduced every year. This situation 
creates uncertainty and reveals the complexity of the current tax framework. 
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Table 5 Personal income tax. Marginal rates and brackets 
1996 1998 2002
Maximum marginal rate 56 48 45
Minimum marginal rate 20 18 15
Number of brackets 16 8 5
 
 
 
• The new income tax code redefined the concept of taxable income by only 
taxing the remaining income after deducting a tax-free allowance. This is the 
so-called “exempted minimum living standard” which replaced a vast set of 
tax-relieves (on health, education expenditure, renting charges etc.) and 
therefore simplified tax administration17. The minimum tax-exempt living 
standard varies in function of personal and family circumstances. 
 
• In order to boost labour supply the reform introduced a number of targeted 
tax-relieves: for women at work, disabled workers, as well as for unemployed 
accepting a job requiring geographical mobility. 
 
• Fiscal advantages are granted to promote the letting house market, which is 
little developed in Spain and represents a major impediment for labour 
mobility. However, as shown above, this measure does not seem to have had a 
noticeable impact on housing prices (see 2.3). 
 
• More favourable fiscal treatment was foreseen for long term savings, 
especially those associated with the 3rd pillar of the pension system. 
 
• Fiscal rebates on labour incomes were introduced for workers aged above 65, 
which aimed to postpone on a voluntary basis the effective retirement age 
beyond the legal age of 65. 
 
The new income tax code has brought about a reduction of households’ direct 
taxation in terms of GDP, which has been offset by an increase of corporate tax 
receipts and some indirect tax rates and receipts sustained by consumption.  
 
In general, the reform of the personal income tax included a set of positive 
measures such as incentives to encourage labour participation and improve the 
functioning of the labour market. Moreover, the new tax scheme also represented 
a more favourable treatment of savings. Specifically, higher relief thresholds for 
                                                 
17  The replacement of tax allowances by an exempted living standard minimum has given rise to a 
discussion on the progressive nature of such a system. A fixed tax-free amount regardless of the 
income level compared to a system without this fixed tax-free amount with the same rates leads to 
some disagreements on its effects on tax saving. In general, the former implies that the percentage 
of tax saving decreases significantly with the income level, but in absolute terms the total amount 
saved increases along with income level. 
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private pension contributions favoured long-term savings related to retirement. 
Furthermore, the reduction of the maximum marginal rates is deemed to have 
involved positive effects, mainly on labour supply, by reducing the distortionary 
effects of taxation.  
 
These tax reforms seem to have also contributed positively to growth and 
employment without jeopardising fiscal consolidation. The official estimates for 
the loss of revenues were set at 0.6% and 0.3% of GDP for the 1998 and 2002 
reforms respectively. However, strong economic activity coupled with buoyant 
job creation led to a loss of revenues much lower than expected. Such reforms 
seem to be an example of financed tax cuts enhancing potential growth and job 
creation (e.g. see European Commission, 2001a, and Leibfritz et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, neither income brackets nor allowances have been updated with 
inflation. Therefore, the fiscal drag has contributed significantly to sustain tax 
collections in a slowdown context. In the 2005 Draft Budget Law the government 
has updated income brackets with inflation, but only by the targeted rate of 2% 
(according to the Commission Autumn 2004 forecast, inflation will be at around 
3% in 2004). All in all, since tax rebates have not been updated and, according to 
the Commission Autumn 2004 forecast, inflation will be at around 3% in 2004, 
less than 1/3 of the total effect of inflation will be offset in 2005.  
 
3.4. Regional budgets and fiscal prudence: Are they compatible? 
 
The progressive assumption of competences by territorial governments has made 
of Spain one of the most decentralised EU Member States. This process already 
began in 1978 after the approval of the Constitution and took its latest step in 
2002 when a further reform of the financing scheme for regional governments was 
implemented. In 1978 local and regional entities represented less than 10% of 
total public expenditures, whereas this percentage reached nearly 46% in 2003 
(33% corresponds to regional authorities and 13% to local authorities)18.  
 
Although this large decentralisation has been so far compatible with the fiscal 
consolidation process initiated in the mid 90s (Table 6), some concerns were 
raised on insufficient co-ordination among general government tiers, which might 
not be ensuring budgetary stability and promote fiscal co-responsibility at all 
government levels. As a result, the new financing system for regional 
governments, which included the transfer of greater spending powers to regional 
authorities, was implemented in 2002 along with the General Law of Budgetary 
Stability (GLBS). This law established the obligation by all general government 
levels to register a balanced budget or a surplus (see annex for the details). In this 
respect, the requirements set up by the GLBS are tighter than those of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). However, the government has launched a discussion on 
the reform of the GLBS. According to it, budgetary stability will be understood in 
                                                 
18 See Ministerio de Hacienda (2003). 
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terms of cyclically adjusted balances, in line with the proposals put forward by the 
Commission in November 2002 to implement the SGP.  
 
Within the current financial system, regional governments can be divided into two 
groups. The first group comprises regional governments with a “special status”, 
which has historically entitled them to collect taxes and have their own system of 
general taxation19 (although the effective tax burden cannot be lower than in the 
rest of Spain). In turn, these territorial governments have to make transfers to the 
central government for services provided by the latter, such as for instance 
defence or foreign affairs. The amount of these transfers is negotiated every five 
years. 
 
Table 6: General government balance by sub-sectors as a percentage of GDP 
Central Government Social Security Regional governments Local governments Total
1995 -5.7 -0.3 -0.6 0.0 -6.6
1996 -3.9 -0.4 -0.6 0.0 -5.0
1997 -2.7 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -3.2
1998 -2.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 -3.0
1999 -1.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -1.2
2000 -1.0 0.4 -0.5 0.1 -0.9
2001 -0.7 0.8 -0.5 0.0 -0.4
2002 -0.5 0.9 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
2003 -0.4 1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.4
Source: INE and IGAE  
 
 
The second group -i.e. regional governments with the so-called “common status”- 
has traditionally had lower fiscal autonomy. In order to increase it, a new 
financing scheme for this second group was approved in 2002. The new system 
featured the transfer of the health and social services management and, 
accordingly, an increase of these regions’ revenues were granted through a higher 
participation in the Central Government’s tax collection, as well as through the 
transfer of the management of other taxes. Table 7 summarises the main features 
of the previous and new system from the revenue side. 
 
Transferred competences have enhanced regional governments’ fiscal joint 
responsibility, as they have strengthened the link between expenditure obligations 
and revenues at the regional level. At the same time, an inter-territorial “common 
sufficiency fund” for solidarity was established in order to avoid sharp financial 
disparities among regions, which might arise from the implementation of the new 
system. Moreover, with the new financial system, indirect taxation becomes more 
important than direct taxation as a source of revenue for regional governments 
(see Table 7). This shift reduces the variability of region’s resources to revenues 
shortfalls, since the indirect tax base is less volatile than the direct one. 
Nevertheless, with the new system, revenues are overall more sensitive to the 
                                                 
19 Excluding social security contributions and tariffs. 
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business cycle because they rely more on taxation than with the old one, in which 
transfers negotiated every five years were the main resource. 
 
Finally, although the system was meant to be re-assessed every five years, a 
revision may take place in the near future. Some regional governments have 
recently asked for a financial reform since they consider that the current system 
does not provide enough resources for the correct functioning of the public health 
care system20. Moreover, for the three-annual stability programme, which is being 
discussed in the Parliament in the framework of the GLBS, the central 
government has allowed for two of the regions to present a fiscal balance in red in 
2005, 2006 and 2007. Since an overall regional balanced budget has to be 
maintained to fulfil the requirements of the current law, this decision also implies 
that some other regions will have to run a surplus to offset the authorised deficits, 
which might prove unrealistic. It might actually create incentives for negotiating 
loose fiscal conditions in a majority of regions, thus leading to aggregate deficits 
in the regional government accounts (see annex). In this context, a looser 
interpretation of the requirements of the GLBS would lead to higher pressures on 
the expenditure side in good times, which would result in persistent structural 
deficits in the future.  
 
 
 
Table 7: Regional government (common status) 
Former agreement (1997-2001) New system (2002-) 
Common 
services 
Indirect taxes and fees, and 
15% of personal income 
tax (PIT), directly imputed 
to regional budgets. 
15% of PIT transferred by the 
State. 
Shares in the State revenues. 
In the first year, this part is 
calculated to assure to each 
regional government a 
balance between revenues 
and expenditure. 
Health-care Transfers for the whole cost 
of health-care to the Social 
Security, which in turn gives 
the funds to those regional 
governments with transferred 
powers in this field. 
Social 
services 
Transfers in the same way as 
health-care 
Indirect taxes and fees 
transferred up to now. 
33% of PIT 
35% of VAT 
40% of excise duties on 
hydrocarbons, tobacco, 
beer and alcohol. 
100% of excise duties on 
electricity and car 
registration. 
Compensatory transfers 
(“Fondo de suficiencia”). 
Financing 
of all 
services. 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Draft Budget 2002). 
 
                                                 
20 Some of these regional governments have approved an additional tax on petrol to finance the 
health care system. 
 35
3.5 Long-term uncertainties 
 
While the general government sector in Spain shows a comfortable 
close-to-balance position, the long-term sustainability of public finances remains 
uncertain and raises concerns due to the expected increase in old-age related 
expenditure. The future pressure on spending appears particularly high in relation 
to pension expenditure.  
 
The public pension system in Spain comprises a compulsory contributory 
insurance scheme operating on a pay-as-you-go basis and a non-contributory 
scheme paying minimum pensions to people non eligible for the contributory 
regime.  
 
Contributory pensions are, by far, the most important expenditure item of the 
social security sub-sector, representing more than 8% of GDP. As for receipts, 
social contributions are the main financial resource and cover expenditure on 
contributory benefits. The rest of the receipts, mainly transfers from the State, 
finances non-contributory benefits.  
 
One important feature of the current public pension system in Spain is that the 
parameters behind the calculation of pensions are assessed to be more generous 
than in other OECD countries (OECD, 2000). For instance, in other EU large 
economies pensions are calculated taking into account earnings over the whole 
working life and not only the latter part of it, as in Spain, where only the latest 15 
years are considered. According to OECD calculations, in the majority of OECD 
countries the average accrual rate21 of entitlement varies between 0.5% and 2% 
compared to 2.9% in Spain.  
 
Despite this generosity, at less than 10% of GDP, total pension expenditure is 
significantly lower in Spain than in most EU member States (see Figure 17). In 
addition, the average pension in Spain represented 64% of GDP per capita in 1998 
whereas the European average was 75% and, therefore, “the widespread opinion 
in the Spanish society that pensions are low would appear to be confirmed by 
cross-country comparisons” (see OECD Economic Surveys, Spain, 2001). Thus, 
over one-third of pensioners receive only a minimum pension and approximately 
50% of pensions for farm-workers, self-employed and domestic employees are 
covered by a supplement to reach the minimum benefit22. 
 
The public pensions system shows a healthy financial position and the 
social-security sub-sector has registered a surplus of around 1% of GDP on a 
national accounts basis in the latest years. This can be explained mainly by two 
factors: strong job creation, which increased the receipts from social 
contributions, and a deceleration of the increase of new pensioners. 
                                                 
21 The estimated rate of return stemming from contributory payments that entitles for a pension. 
22 In addition, the average retirement pension has exceeded the minimum wage only since 1990. 
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Figure 17: Total pension expenditure as percentage of GDP (2001) 
(1) Occupational pension schemes for private-sector employees with constituted
reserves are not included.
Source: EUROSTAT
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However, despite this healthy financial situation, according to most of the 
available pension expenditure projections, released by both individual researches 
and public institutions, the sustainability of the current public pension system 
could be threatened by the budgetary impact of ageing population. 
 
In particular, the projection made by the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 
working group on ageing (see European Commission, 2001b) foresees a sharp 
increase in pension expenditure from less than 9% of GDP in 2005 to nearly 17% 
in 2050 (other projections are included in Table 8).  
 
The limitations of these projections are clear: they are in some cases bound to 
show highly accentuated profiles and therefore their results need to be interpreted 
with caution. However, even if the projections presented in table 8 are based on a 
different methodology and assumptions, all of them foresee a non-negligible 
budgetary impact on the public pension system in Spain in twenty or twenty five 
years time. 
 
Indeed, demographic trends are a main determinant of such projections. Although 
later than most European countries, the Spanish demographic structure will show 
a sharp increase in the old-age dependency ratio, especially from the second 
quarter of the current century. This could reduce potential output growth by 
shrinking labour supply while the effects of ageing on expenditure will be 
exacerbated by the expected increase in health-care spending related to elderly 
people. 
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Table 8: Pension expenditure projections as a percentage of GDP (2000-2050) 
2000 2005 2025 2050 Peak-2000 Type of pensions
EPC (2001) Total pensions
Baseline scenario 9.4 8.8 11.0 17.3 2050 17.3 7.9
Lisbon scenario 9.4 8.9 10.6 16.2 2045 16.2 6.8
Herce and Alonso (2000) Contributory 
Baseline scenario 9.8 8.1 9.9 13.4 2045 13.7 3.9 pensions
Jimeno* (2000) Contributory 
Baseline scenario 8.9 10.3 14.8 32.0 2050 32.0 23.1 pensions
a) retirement age 70 8.9 6.4 7.6 15.1 2050 15.1 6.2
b) whole working life 8.9 - 12.8 25.2 - - -
c) 75% current replace. ratio 8.9 - 13.3 27.0 - - -
Ministerio de Trabajo** (2002) Contributory
Baseline scenario 8.4 7.5 9.9 13.0 2050 13.0 4.6 pensions plus
 pension supplements.
 Civil servants' 
scheme for central 
government is not 
included
Balmaseda and Tello (2003) Contributory 
Baseline scenario 5.5 5.3 6.0 8.0 2045 8.2 2.7 old-age pensions
a) retirement age 70 5.5 5.3 4.6 6.8 2050 6.8 1.3
b) whole working life 5.5 5.3 6.1 7.2 2045 7.5 2.0
Serrano, García and Bravo*** (2003) - 8.2 9.9 11.3 2040 11.3 3.2 Total pensions
*For the J.F. Jimeno study the figures for 2005 correspond to 2010
** For the Ministry of Labour projection, figures for 2025 correspond to 2030
*** For Serrano, Gracía and Bravo, figures for 2050 correspond to 2040
Peak year
 
 
 
A growing net immigration flow could dampen down some of the consequences 
of ageing by offsetting partially the current demographic trends. High net 
immigration registered in latest years in Spain, which is not fully reflected in most 
of the projections shown in Table 8, might partially counterbalance the budgetary 
implications of ageing. However, the relief that immigration may suppose for the 
sustainability of public finances is only of a transitory nature, since these new 
workers will eventually become pensioners. Nevertheless, given the low 
participation rates of the Spanish economy, there is still a wide margin of 
manoeuvre to raise employment rates, which would attenuate the financial impact 
of ageing.  
 
Another important element directly influencing pension expenditure projections 
refers to the assumptions on the link between the average pension benefit and 
average productivity per worker. In this respect, a steady increase of the latter 
relative to the former would ease some pressure on pension expenditure. 
However, given the uncertainty over future demographic trends and the effects of 
productivity growth on the average pension benefit, the possibility of large fiscal 
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imbalances stemming from pension expenditure over the next decades cannot be 
ruled out. There is therefore a case to ask whether the strategy put in place so far 
is adequate to meet the budgetary cost associated with ageing in Spain. 
 
This strategy is based on several building blocks: first, the Permanent 
Commission of the “Pacto de Toledo”23 regularly reviews progress in the pension 
system towards financial sustainability, i.e. equilibrium between contributions and 
payments. Second, Spain is accumulating reserve funds for future pension 
payments: they should account for 2.6% of GDP in 2007. Third, structural 
reforms are underway in labour markets to increase participation rates. Fourth, the 
development of a multi-pillar pension system should also contribute to the long 
term sustainability of the pension system. Finally, the ongoing policy strategy of 
debt reduction is deemed to contribute very positively to improve the long term 
sustainability of public finances, since it involves a steady reduction of the interest 
rate burden.  
 
All measures adopted so far in order to increase labour market participation, 
reduce public debt and build up the pension fund reserve go in the right direction. 
Nevertheless, they appear insufficient on their own to avoid risks derived from 
ageing and should be complemented with a reform of the key parameters of the 
pension system, such as the number of contributory years, the retirement age and 
the replacement ratio (European Commission, 2003b). The agreement within the 
recently renewed "Pacto de Toledo" considers several recommendations to reform 
the pension system. These recommendations, consistent with the BEPGs for 
Spain, aim at prolonging working life and raising employment rates (especially of 
women) while strengthening the relationship between the contributory effort and 
benefits. This would in fact involve the reform of the key parameters of the 
system. However, such recommendations have not been translated yet into 
concrete measures. 
 
Annex: The General Law of Budgetary Stability 
 
Spain’s General Law of Budgetary Stability (GLBS) was approved in 2002 and 
entered into force in 2003. Its goal is to ensure that increased fiscal 
decentralisation following the new financing system for regional governments 
does not come at the expenses of budgetary stability. Its principal provisions can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
• Each entity in the public sector will have to fulfil the criterion of budgetary 
stability defined as “a situation of balance or in surplus in terms of financing 
capacity according to ESA 95 methodology”. 
 
                                                 
23 The “Pacto de Toledo” is a politically broad-based agreement approved by the Parliament, 
which aims at ensuring the viability of the public pension system. The content of the text is made 
up of recommendations and general guidelines for a future reform of the public pension system. 
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• The central government will release each year budgetary stability objectives 
for the whole of the general government and for each sub-sector for the next 
three years, consistent with the Stability Programme economic scenario. 
 
• Each public entity will have to produce a budget respecting the balanced 
budget or surplus requirement. Budget planning will take place over a three-
year framework. 
 
• The central government will monitor budgetary execution and will examine 
the degree of fulfilment of the stability objectives. Imbalances will have to be 
justified by the entities concerned and will require the formulation of a three-
year plan to correct them.  
 
• The central government will be able to condition any recourse to debt by sub-
national governments to the fulfilment of the budgetary stability objectives. 
Eventual financial penalties stemming from non-fulfilment of Spain’s 
obligation under SGP and the Maastricht Treaty will be shared by those public 
entities responsible for the deficits. 
 
The GLBS was a direct answer to the problems raised by the interaction between 
EMU fiscal rules and fiscal decentralisation. Thus, the Law has been mainly 
justified by the necessity to consolidate the recent achievements in a context of 
growing fiscal decentralisation. The budgetary challenges associated with ageing 
along with the absence of an institutional culture of fiscal discipline are additional 
arguments that support the need for a constraining framework to guarantee long-
term sustainability. The Law can be seen as a means to maintain sound public 
finances, while allowing for sharing fiscal responsibility among all general 
government tiers for the respect of fiscal commitments undertaken at European 
level. It redresses the potential asymmetry regarding the budgetary stability 
objective between the central government, which is the only responsible for fiscal 
consolidation commitments vis-à-vis EU authorities, and regional and local 
governments that have an increasing role in public expenditure. 
 
A principal criticism, which has been levelled also at the Stability and Growth 
Pact, is that the objective of budgetary stability defined as a balanced or surplus 
budget hampers the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. Arguably, the fiscal rule 
implemented by the GLBS is more rigid that the SGP’s “close to balance or in 
surplus”. The budgetary stability objectives of the GLBS have to be fulfilled 
every year, independently of the cycle.  Neither can surpluses in one sub-sector 
offset deficits in others (although the State and Social Security System accounts 
will continue to be consolidated for the next ten years). Moreover, should deficits 
occur, the responsible public entities will have three years to restore the balanced 
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budget24. In case of a severe recession, this period might prove to be insufficient 
and could give rise to a pro cyclical policy while making difficult to apply the tax 
smoothing principle. 
 
In addition, the increased planning and information requirements placed on sub-
national governments, if carried out as foreseen in the Law, should improve the 
quality of public finances while facilitating its monitoring. However, little 
progress has been made so far in this respect and the information on regional 
government accounts continues to be scarce. 
 
All in all, the bounds and procedures set in GLBS are tighter than the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. However, some margin of 
flexibility arguably exists, especially for the budget implementation phase. 
Moreover, by taking a longer perspective, and in order to maintain sound fiscal 
finances, spending ceilings may be needed to avoid future tax increases, in 
particular in the light of the budgetary costs associated to ageing. In this context, 
given the relatively high decentralisation of the budget process in Spain, the 
reform of the GLBS, unless rigorously applied over the cycle, might lead to a 
looser spending control, and higher deficits25. 
 
In parallel to the claims expressed by some regional authorities asking for a new 
financial scheme for regional governments, the new government in office after the 
general elections in March 2004 is planning to relax the rules raised by the GLBS. 
According to the available information, this reform will entail a new definition of 
“budgetary stability” based on the cyclical position of the economy while 
respecting the jurisdictional powers on fiscal issues of the regional and local 
governments. 
 
These changes might imply that the Central government should negotiate with 
each regional government its budgetary objectives, which according to the 
planned reform would take into account three elements: 
 
1) The fiscal effort made by the richest regions in order to transfer resources to 
the poorest regions; 
 
2) The economic situation of each region; and 
 
3) Particular and unforeseen events having a budgetary impact on public 
regional accounts (e.g., the ecological disaster caused by the oil tanker 
“Prestige”).  
 
                                                 
24 The average cycle length in Spain is about seven years. Thus, a three year period for correcting 
imbalances might turn out to be too short, specially taking into account that the cycle affects 
public finances and the balance is known with a certain delay.  
25 For fragmentation of budgeting institutions as a source of excessive spending see Hallerberg and 
von Hagen (1999) and von Hagen and Harden (1994). 
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As a result, these elements would entail a specific budgetary target for each 
regional government, which contrasts with the current obligation of registering a 
balanced budget or in surplus for all regional authorities. While there is still a high 
degree of uncertainty regarding the reform of the GLBS, a close coordination 
among general government levels and a strict monitoring of their budgetary 
outcome should be preserved. 
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Part II: A virtuous long-lasting cycle? 
 
 
As shown in the introductory section, Spain has made significant progress in the 
last twenty years in terms of real convergence with the rest of the euro area. This 
process has taken place within a context of growing openness, further enhanced 
by the accession to the EU in 1986. Convergence has been especially strong since 
the mid-nineties. While the Spanish per capita income represented 79.3% of the 
average income of the euro area in 1995, the corresponding figure in 2003 was 
86.4%. These figures stem from a large growth differential between Spain and the 
euro area: in the period 1995-2003, GDP in Spain grew at an annual average rate 
of 3.25% compared to 2.0% in the euro area26.  
 
GDP per capita can be decomposed into the apparent labour productivity, the 
employment rate and the ratio between working age and total population27. Since 
the latter can be taken as given over periods of ten years or so28, changes in the 
employment rate and productivity growth are the major explanatory factors of per 
capita income growth in the medium-term. 
 
Since 1995, employment growth in Spain has been buoyant. Between 1995 and 
2003, annual employment growth averaged 2.6% (1.2% in the euro area as a 
whole), which contrasts with the rate of 1.6% recorded between 1985 and 1995 
(0.7% in the euro area). As a result, since the mid 1990s the employment rate in 
Spain29 rose by almost 13 percentage points to attain 59.7% in 2003. These 
figures compare with a much more modest performance in the euro area, where 
the employment rate grew by 4.5 percentage points (from 57.9% in 1995 to 62.4% 
in 2003). The strong job creation brought the Spanish unemployment rate down 
from 19% in 1995 to slightly above 11% in 2003. In contrast, the unemployment 
rate in the euro area only fell by 1.8 percentage points in the same period, 
standing at 8.8% in 2003.  
 
However, where productivity growth is concerned, the Spanish performance is 
less brilliant. Labour productivity in Spain has slowed down from 1.4% on 
average in the period 1985-1995 to 0.6% since 1995 (1.6% and 0.9% in the euro 
area). Moreover, total factor productivity in Spain has also decelerated from 0.7% 
                                                 
26 The growth differential in the previous business cycle was much narrower. During the period 
1985-1995, Spain and the euro area registered average growth rates of 3.0% and 2.4%, 
respectively. 
27 Note that GDP per capita, Y/P, where Y is GDP and P population can be expressed as 
Y/P = (Y/L)(L/WAP)(WAP/P), where L represents persons employed and WAP stands for 
working age population. While (Y/L) is the apparent labour productivity, (L/WAP) is the 
employment rate. 
28 For the period 1960-2003, this rate varies between 64% and 68% for both Spain and the euro 
area 
29 The employment rate is the ratio between total employment and population aged between 15 and 
64. 
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to 0.3% during the same period (1.2% to 0.5% in the euro area). High job creation 
in low-productivity activities along with low educational attainment of the labour 
force, modest expenditure on R&D and ICT, limited innovation and insufficient 
competition in some sectors are often mentioned as the main elements behind the 
poor productivity developments in Spain (see European Commission, 2003b). 
 
In the light of this growth model, characterised by an intensive use of labour 
coupled with slow productivity growth, a central question appears particularly 
relevant: is the current convergence process sustainable in the medium and long 
term?  
 
Employment performance is determined by the functioning of the labour market 
and institutional factors, whereas the evolution of apparent labour productivity 
will depend on capital intensity (capital/labour ratio) and total factor productivity. 
 
But nominal factors also matter, for convergence, in the long-run. A persistently 
positive inflation differential with the euro area due to malfunctioning of labour 
and/or product markets translates into growing cost pressure for export sectors, 
whose ability to set up prices without losing market share is rather limited. In the 
context of EMU, it is no longer possible to recover competitiveness through 
currency devaluations and the existence of persistent inflation differentials 
involve deteriorations of mark-ups of export companies that contribute to 
deteriorate the competitive position of the economy, unless they are offset by 
productivity gains.  
 
Accordingly, in order to get further insight as regards the evolution of GDP per 
capita, the next chapter focuses on the functioning of the labour market. Chapter 5 
will focus on the determinants of labour productivity, namely the evolution of the 
capital-labour ratio and total factor productivity. Finally, since the interplay 
between productivity growth, prices and wages determines the external 
competitive position of an economy, chapter 6 explores nominal developments 
and the associated risks for the real convergence of the Spanish economy with the 
euro area. 
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 4. The labour market 
 
 
The employment rate in Spain has increased by 13 percentage points in the last 
decade, helping sustain convergence in GDP per capita with the euro area. 
However, there is still a wide margin to improve labour market outcomes. 
Employment rates are still far from the Lisbon targets and the unemployment 
rates, particularly for female and youth, are high by EU standards. Further 
efforts should be pursued in order to increase female employability, notably 
through higher provision of childcare facilities, greater use of part-time contracts 
and more provision of vocational training matching labour market needs.  
 
One relevant characteristic of the Spanish labour market is a lower use of part-
time contracts, but a much higher use of fixed-term contracts than in other 
Member States. Specifically, one third of wage earners have a fixed-term contract. 
This could hamper human capital investment while affecting other elements of 
labour flexibility such as geographical mobility. Four lines of action can be 
considered to reduce segmentation. Firstly, given the success in promoting 
employment on a permanent basis achieved by the new open ended contract with 
lower firing costs introduced in 1997, further steps in this direction appear 
advisable. Secondly, despite the recent implementation of some legal mechanisms 
of control, fixed-term contracts are often used beyond their legal purpose of 
covering temporary needs of firms. Therefore, a closer monitoring appears 
appropriate. Thirdly, measures targeted at promoting part-time contracts should 
help reduce the share of temporary contracts while promoting female 
participation. Apart from these horizontal measures, the considerable 
concentration of fixed-term contracts in some particular sectors may call for 
targeted measures in some activity branches, namely construction. Finally, a 
reform of wage-setting oriented to better reflect productivity developments across 
regions and economic circumstances at the firm level, jointly with a further 
review of the employment protection legislation would help create more 
permanent jobs. 
 
4.1. Working hard 
Sharp downturns and the equally strong recoveries translated into a more erratic 
evolution of employment growth than in the euro area (see Figure 18). The 
remarkable dynamism of the labour market since the mid-90s led to an impressive 
record of employment growth and unemployment reduction. Specifically, in the 
period 1995-2003 employment in Spain grew by 2.5% on average per year on a 
national accounts basis (Figure 18) compared to 1.1% in the euro area30. 
                                                 
30 Between 1986 and 1991 employment in Spain grew by 3.2% compared to 1.5% in the euro area. 
This strong employment growth came hand in hand with an average GDP growth of 4.2% and 
3.2% in Spain and the euro area, respectively. In contrast, in spite of similar GDP growth rates in 
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Moreover, job creation in Spain continued at a sustained pace during the 
2001-2003 slowdown (1.9% compared to 0.7% in the euro area), sharply 
contrasting with the massive employment destruction experienced in previous 
downturns31. According to the Commission Autumn 2004 forecasts, employment 
in Spain will keep growing faster than in the euro area. However, the gap is 
envisaged to narrow. Employment growth will resume at 1.9% in Spain, 
compared with 0.5% and 0.9% in the euro area in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
 
Figure 18: Employment growth (annual rates), 1995-2005 
Source: AMECO
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As a result, since 1995 the Spanish employment rate has increased briskly by 
more than 13 percentage points (see Table 9), standing now close to 60% (slightly 
below 62% for the euro area). Furthermore, although sharing the same downward 
trend as in the rest of the EU, in terms of hours worked per week, Spain still 
remains above the euro area. The average weekly working time is 39.7 hours in 
Spain against 37.4 in the euro area. In 1995, the corresponding figures were 40.4 
and 38.4, respectively.  
 
Table 9: Labour market performance 
1995 2003 Change 1995 2003 Change 1995 2002 Change 1995 2003 Change
Spain 46.9 59.7 12.8 59.0 67.3 8.3 18.8 11.3 -7.5 16.1 11.8 -4.3
Euro area 57.9 62.4 4.5 65.2 68.6 3.4 10.6 8.4 -2.2 9.6 8.9 -0.7
Sources: EUROSTAT and AMECO
Employment rate Participation rate Unemployment rate NAWRU
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
the period 1992-1994 (0.8% in Spain and 1% in the euro area), employment fell by 1.6% in Spain 
compared with 0.9% in the euro area. In the trough of the recession in 1993, employment fell by 
2.8% in Spain against 1.6% in the euro area. 
31 During the 1980s and the first half of 1990s, GDP growth at around 2% entailed job losses. In 
contrast, in 2002 output grew by 2.2% and employment rose by 1.5% on a national accounts basis.  
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The remarkable improvement in the employment rate vis-à-vis the euro area has 
taken place in parallel with an increase in the participation and a sharp reduction 
of unemployment32. The activity rate in Spain rose from 59.0% in 1995 to 67.3% 
in 2003, narrowing the gap vis-à-vis the euro area, where the rate stood at 68.6%. 
The unemployment rate in Spain, although still the highest in the euro area, has 
been steadily falling from its peak of around 20% in 1994 to slightly above 11% 
in 2003. The positive change in labour market outcomes with respect to past 
trends is explained by:  
 
i) EMU membership and the associated stability-oriented macroeconomic policies 
brought about a less volatile pattern of output growth and a more stable financial 
framework. Stability, in turn, improved business expectations and had an 
expansionary impact on labour demand from firms. 
 
ii) The labour market reforms implemented in the 1990's have improved the 
functioning of the labour market (Box 6).  
 
iii) Some social and demographic changes, especially high net immigration 
registered in recent years33, has increased labour supply and enhanced work force 
flexibility while reducing labour shortages experienced in past upturns. In this 
respect, the increase in female labour participation has also played a significant 
role.  
 
iv) A significant change in trade unions' strategy with respect to the late eighties 
and early nineties, accepting wage moderation in exchange of higher employment 
growth. This has resulted in a marked moderation in nominal unit labour costs 
(ULC) since the mid 1990s, in sheer contrast with what happened during the 
expansionary cycle in 1986-1991 (see chapter 6)34.  
 
v) Finally, the expansion of some labour-intensive sectors, namely construction 
and some services, has significantly contributed to sustain employment growth. 
                                                 
32 The sharp rise in the employment rate was due to both a significant increase in the activity rate 
coupled with a marked unemployment fall. The following identity is illustrative: 
===
population Active
Employment
population age Working
population Active
population age Working
Employmentrate Employment *  
rate)nt unemployme-(1*rate)(Activity =  
Thus, the high increase in the employment ratio in Spain during the period 1995-2003 relative to 
the euro area (nearly 13 and 5 percentage points respectively) stems from a much higher rise in the 
activity rate (8 and 3.5 percentage points approximately) and a much sharper decline in the 
unemployment rate (around 7 and 2 percentage points). 
33 Latest data released by the INE estimate the total foreign population at around 2.500.000 people 
in 2003 compared to 637.000 in 1998. Additionally, the average age of these population inflows is 
significantly lower than the resident population. 
34 It is worth noting an additional important feature in relation to ULC. Since the mid 1990s real 
ULC (nominal ULC adjusted by GDP deflator) have been registering negative growth rates, which 
is also in sharp contrast with the previous business cycle. This represents factual wage moderation, 
since real wages have been growing below productivity.  
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All in all, these elements allowed not only for a steady reduction in the 
unemployment rate but also for a significant decline in the structural 
unemployment measured by the NAWRU (Non-accelerating wage rate of 
unemployment) which is estimated to have fallen from 16.7% in 1993 to 11.8% in 
2003 (Table 9). The remarkable labour market performance seems to have given 
rise to a virtuous interaction between job creation and output growth. Specifically, 
resilience of employment growth during the 2001-2003 slowdown has supported 
domestic demand through private consumption and investment in dwellings, 
which, as shown in chapter 2, has in turn stimulated GDP growth. Given the 
prominent role played by the labour market in the last business cycle in Spain, it 
seems relevant to raise the following two questions: 1) To what extent current 
developments can be maintained in the short to medium-term?, and 2) what 
particular aspects of the Spanish labour market should be improved in order to 
sustain employment and economic growth in the long-term? The next sections 
address these questions. 
 
4.2. Gender and age discrimination in an immobile labour force 
In spite of the notable results achieved during the last decade in Spain in terms of 
employment growth and unemployment reduction, there still is much room for 
improvement in the labour market. Somewhat lower than 60%, the employment 
rate in Spain still remains below the euro area average (62.4%) and far from the 
Lisbon objectives. The Lisbon strategy sets specific targets to be achieved by 
2010: the overall employment ratio should reach 70% of the working age 
population (67% in 2005). 
 
Figure 19: Employment rates by gender in Spain and the euro area, 
1992-2003 
Source: EUROSTAT
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Aggregate figures conceal sizeable divergences across genders (Figure 19). Male 
employment rates in Spain rose from 62.5% in 1995 (69.4% in the euro area) to 
73.2% in 2003, exceeding the euro area average of 71.3%. However the 
performance of female employment is far from satisfactory. The female 
employment rate rose from 31.7% in 1995 to 46% in 2003 (46.6% and 53.5% in 
the euro area, respectively), still very far from the Lisbon targets (60% by 2010). 
 
 
Box 6: Main labour market reforms in Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1984  Deregulation of fixed-term contracts by abolishing the “causality principle”. New
kind of temporary contracts, namely, the employment promotion contract (see paragraph 4.2),
the training and practice contracts for young workers and a specific contract for launching new
activities which benefited from tax exemptions. 
Unemployment benefits: minimum period of contribution established at 6 months
allowing for 3 months of benefits. Maximum entitlement period 2 years. Substitution rate
80/70/60. 
 
1989  Unemployment assistance extended for some groups (older and long-term
unemployed) 
 
1992 Reform of the unemployment benefit scheme by raising the contributory period:
minimum contributory period extended to one year (3 months of benefits).Tax exemptions for
training and practice contracts were eliminated. 
 
1994 Reestablishment of the principle of causality as a general rule for fixed-term
contracts: the employment promotion fixed-term contract is only kept for some specific
groups (workers over 45 and long-term unemployed). Elimination of the training contract and
creation of apprenticeship contract. The “ordinary” fixed-term contracts are kept but subject to
“causality principle”. 
 Changes in the regulation of dismissals procedures: conditions for collective
dismissals were clearly stipulated and the time the authorities were given to take a decision in
this kind of firings was shortened. Economic circumstances were included in the reasons
justifying individual dismissals. 
A range of issues on working conditions are no longer regulated and can be
negotiated through collective bargaining. 
Unemployment benefits are considered as taxable income 
 
1997 The employment promotion fixed-term contract is completely abolished. 
New permanent contract with lower dismissals costs only applicable to workers
below 30 or over 45, long-term unemployed and disabled workers.  The new amount to be paid
by firms in case of unfair dismissal was set at 33 day’s wages per year of seniority with a
maximum of 24 months’ wages compared to 45 day’s wages per year of seniority with a
maximum of 42 month’s wages in the standard permanent contract. In addition, non-negligible
social security rebates for the two first years of the contract were implemented. 
 
1998 New part-time contract: clear definition of what is considered part-time job by
establishing a limit on total hours worked (77% of hours worked in a full-time job). The total
number of hours worked and their distribution must be specified in the contract. Social
protection of workers with part-time contract is enhanced.  
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2001 Extension of the permanent contact introduced in 1997 with lower dismissals costs
to some categories of wage earners and while maintaining social security rebates (However,
male aged between 30 and 45 remained outside the scope of such contracts). 
Dismissals costs introduced for fixed-term contracts (8 days per year worked) 
New part-time contract deregulating almost completely the distribution of working time. The
limit of 77% of hours worked in a full-time job was abolished. 
 
2002 Tougher criteria for unemployment benefit eligibility (both contributory and
non-contributory, the latter are now to be means-tested) along with stricter requirements in
relation to labour mobility for unemployed people receiving benefits. 
Lower dismissals costs through the transitional wages (“salarios de tramitación”) paid pending
judicial proceedings for unfair dismissals: if the employer accepts within 48 hours that the
dismissal is unfair and makes effective the corresponding severance payment, then the
transitional wages do not have to be paid.  
Gradual phasing out of the special unemployment benefit scheme for the
agricultural workers in force in Andalucía and Extremadura. However, in 2003 a system with
similar characteristics to the previous one was implemented for agricultural workers excluded
by the reform in 2002.  abour market outcomes also largely vary in function of age. The employment 
ate for elderly workers, which fell markedly to 32.3% in 1995 due to staff 
djustments through early retirement schemes in the aftermath of the early 90s’ 
ecession, rose again in 1996 to reach 40.8% in 2003, which compares with 37.8% 
n the euro area (see Figure 20). Despite such a positive performance, the 
mployment rate of elderly workers in Spain remains distant from the Lisbon 
bjective set for this cohort (50% by 2010). At the opposite extreme of the age 
cale, at 33.4%, the youth employment rate in Spain in 2003 remains below the 
uro area (36.2%), although the gap has narrowed markedly in the latest years. In 
995, only 24.4% of young Spaniards were employed, which compares with 
3.7% in the euro area. 
igure 20: Employment rates of old workers (55 to 64 years) 
Source: EUROSTAT
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Figure 21: Participation rates by gender in Spain and the euro area, 
1992-2003 
Source: EUROSTAT
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The sharp divergences in the employment rates by gender are mirrored in 
participation and unemployment rates. While at present the men participation rate 
in Spain is higher than in the euro area average (nearly 80% and 78%, 
respectively), the rate for females increased by nearly 15 percentage points since 
1992 to attain 55% in 2003, but it still remains clearly below the euro area average 
(60%). 
 
Figure 22: Unemployment rates by gender in Spain and the euro area, 
1992-2003 
Source: EUROSTAT
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Despite the recent strong job creation, the unemployment rate in Spain (11.3% in 
2003) still remains the highest in the euro area (8.4% on average). In line with the 
employment and participation rates, the high unemployment in Spain relative to 
the euro area is to a large extent explained by the female component that tracked 
16.4% in 2002, almost twice as high as the euro area average. In contrast, male 
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unemployment has considerably narrowed the gap with respect the euro area 
during the latest years. Male unemployment in Spain dwindled from 18% in 1995 
to 8.0% in 2002. This compares with euro area rates of 8.8% and 7.3% for the 
same years (see Figure 22).  
 
In terms of age distribution differences in unemployment are also sharp between, 
on the one hand, people in the prime age and, on the other hand, the elderly and 
the youngest. The situation is particularly worse for young workers. Youth 
unemployment rate stood at 22.2% in 2003, 8.2% in the euro area, (see Figure 
23). Conversely, although in 1995 the unemployment rate for old workers (aged 
between 55 and has closed 64) was four points higher in Spain than in the euro 
area, the gap has closed and the unemployment rate for this age category is 6.5% 
in both Spain and the euro area in 200335.  
 
Figure 23: Unemployment rate for youth (15-24 years) 
Source: EUROSTAT
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In addition, there are large inequalities in the geographical distribution of 
unemployment. Andalucía and Extremadura, two southern regions, with 18.6% 
and 17.4%, respectively, recorded the highest unemployment rates in 2003, 
whereas at the opposite geographical and socio-economic extremes, Navarra and 
La Rioja registered rates of 5.5% and 6.1% respectively. In Madrid and Catalonia, 
the corresponding figures were 7.2% and 9.3% respectively (see Figure 24). These 
disparities across regions point to a low geographical mobility of the labour force, 
which in turn is amplified by the functioning of housing market, particularly by 
the poor development of rental housing. Moreover, the wage bargaining system 
does not sufficiently take into account productivity differences across regions 
(European Commission, 2003b) and, therefore, a more decentralised wage setting 
is frequently recommended (see box 7). 
                                                 
35 In 1995, old-workers unemployment rates were 12.3% and 8.3% in Spain and the euro area, 
respectively (source Eurostat, New Cronos). 
 52
Figure 24: Regional unemployment rates in 2003 
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According to these facts, labour is not a scarce input in Spain and the remarkable 
results achieved in terms of growing activity and employment rates still have a 
wide margin of manoeuvre to improve and approach the Lisbon objectives. Active 
labour market policies aiming at further increasing employment rates should be 
particularly targeted at promoting women and youth employability (see European 
Commission, 2003b). In this respect, it must be pointed out that the resources 
allocated to active labour market policies (ALMP) are lower than in the large euro 
area economies (except Italy), and funding for the employment service and for 
training of unemployed workers is very limited (see OECD, 2003)36, especially 
taking into account the unemployment rate differential vis-à-vis other large EU 
economies. 
 
Further efforts aiming at increasing female employability should be pursued, 
notably through higher provision of childcare facilities and the promotion of 
greater use of part-time contracts (see European Commission, 2003b). The use of 
such contracts has hardly made any progress between 1995 and 2003 (8% of total 
employment in Spain) and remains well below the EU standards37. The reforms of 
part-time contracts implemented in 1998 and 2001 did not succeed in promoting 
this contractual labour arrangement. The reform of 1998 established a new 
part-time contract imposing a strict regulation of working time distribution, which 
                                                 
36 ALMP in Spain represented 0.84% of GDP in 2001 compared to 1.31%, 1.21% in France and 
Germany respectively. Resources to finance the national employment service reached 0.18% and 
0.23 % of GDP in France and Germany in contrast with 0.09% in Spain in the same year. 
37 This contrast with the increase registered in the euro area during the same period: from 14% to 
nearly 17% of total employment. 
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resulted into a too rigid contract for employers. Conversely, the 2001 reform 
deregulated working38 time almost completely and rendered this contract little 
attractive for workers. 
 
 
Box 7: The wage bargaining system in Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
cDespite the low level of unionization, at around 15% of wage earners, nearly 90% of wage
earners in the private sector in Spain are covered by collective agreements negotiated by the
most representative trade unions and employers’ associations (see Izquierdo et al. (2003) and
Pérez Infante (2004) for a thorough description of the Spanish wage bargaining system). 
  
Collective bargaining in Spain can take place at different levels: company level or industry
level. The latter has in turn different geographical levels (local, provincial, regional or
national). In terms of number of workers collective agreements are negotiated mostly at the
industry and provincial level (more than 50% of wage earners under wage agreements). The
second most important bargaining level is the national industry level, covering nearly 25% of
workers, while regional industry agreements only affect 9% of workers. Finally, the working
conditions of only 10% of wage earners are settled at company level. 
 
This specific distribution of the bargaining level is closely linked to the average size of the
Spanish companies according to the number of workers. Thus, company and national industry
agreements involve large firms (more than 250 workers on average) while provincial industry
level is made up of small companies (at around 15 workers on average).  
 
Therefore, most of the collective agreements are at a sectoral and provincial level and affect
mainly small firms. From a theoretical point of view, such an intermediate system of collective
bargaining (neither centralised nor decentralised) is not optimal since it yields less efficient
results in terms of wage adjustment in the face of changing labour market conditions. On the
one hand, a more centralised system would make easier the internalization in the agreement of
constraints stemming from macroeconomic conditions. On the other hand, a more decentralised
wage setting should provide more margin of manoeuvre so as to take into account specific
firms’ situations (see Bentolila and Jimeno, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, given that around 75% of Spanish firms have 10 workers or less, and thus
according to the current regulations they do not have union elections, a fully decentralised
system would be difficult to implement. Rather, it would seem desirable to increase
coordination among the different levels of bargaining by more clearly delimiting the areas to
be covered at each level. This should give room to better reflect local labour market conditions
as well as specific circumstances at the firm level. In this respect, in 1997 the social partners
signed an agreement on collective bargaining (“Acuerdo Interconfederal”) in order to raise the
level of co-ordination of the wage bargaining system. However, so far the progress made in
applying this agreement has been rather modest and no further steps in this direction have been
taken recently.  54
                                                
8 Most workers with a part-time contract in Spain declare they hold such a contract because they 
ould not find a full-time job. 
 4.3. A segmented labour market 
The high share of fixed-term contracts and the low number of part-time jobs in 
Spain may have a close relationship (Toharia et al., 2004). The flexibility 
provided by part-time contracts in other Member States appears to be achieved in 
Spain by the disproportionate use of fixed-term contracts (see Figure 25).  
 
Figure 25: Fixed-term and part-time contracts 
Source: EUROSTAT
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Spain presents the characteristics of a formally segmented labour market, i.e. 
permanent contracts offering a high degree of on-the-job protection coexist with 
temporary contracts with almost no restriction on hiring and firing. At present, 
temporary contracts account for nearly one third of total employment, more than 
twice the EU average (Figure 25). 
 
The origin of this segmentation dates back to the first half of the 1980s, when the 
high unemployment rate registered in Spain triggered the adoption of deregulating 
measures aimed at increasing labour market flexibility. Given the opposition of 
trade unions to these measures, the 1984 labour market reform introduced 
significant changes in the regulation of fixed-term contracts while leaving 
untouched the employment protection legislation for permanent workers, giving 
rise to the so called “flexibility at the margin”39. The result of this reform was a 
                                                 
39 Specifically, the prevailing “causality principle” for fixed-term contracts, according to which 
fixed-term contracts could only be used for temporary needs of the firms, was weakened and 
companies were allowed to hire non permanent workers to carry out their permanent activities. 
The most important new temporary contract brought about by the 1984 reform was the 
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significant increase in the use of fixed-term contracts during the second half of the 
1980s: from a share lower than 10% before the 1984 reform to near 30% in 1989 
and a first peak at around 34% in 1992. Despite the legal changes introduced since 
1994 restricting the use of temporary contracts (see below), the proportion of 
fixed-term contracts has only decreased slightly and appears to have stabilised at 
around 30%. 
 
All sectors of activity in Spain record a higher share of fixed-term contracts than 
in the rest of the euro area. Nevertheless, more than 50% of temporary jobs 
concentrate on six sectors: agriculture, construction, wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels and restaurants, domestic services and public administration. Construction 
shows by far the highest percentage of fixed-term contracts (nearly 60% 
compared to 22% in the euro area). By specific groups, almost 50% of temporary 
workers are below 30 years old, while females record a higher share of fixed-term 
contracts than males (at around 34% and 29% respectively). In terms of 
educational levels, workers with lower education attainment have the highest 
probability of being employed on a temporary basis (42%), although 24% of 
temporary workers are university graduates. 
 
The success of fixed-term contracts in Spain is still a matter of discussion. Given 
the strict regulations on permanent employment, the main attractiveness of fixed-
term contracts is the flexibility and low firing costs they entail. This kind of 
contracts allow for a quick adaptation of the staff to changing economic 
conditions. An important element in the assessment of fixed-term contracts is 
whether workers with temporary arrangements are trapped in this situation for a 
long time or, on the contrary, can obtain a permanent job after a relatively short 
period. In the latter case, temporary contracts would be used as screening devices 
that allow employers to observe workers’ performance. Accordingly, skilful 
workers would obtain a permanent contract after a probation period holding a 
fixed-term contract (Guell Rotllan and Petrongolo, 2000). However, current and 
historical data suggest that the transition from a temporary to a permanent post in 
Spain is, in general, rather slow and takes longer at present than in the past 
(Amuedo Dorantes, 2000) 40. 
 
During the last decade, labour market reforms have aimed at reintroducing 
constraints in the use of temporary contracts while easing employment protection 
legislation for permanent workers41. These reforms, however, do not seem to have 
                                                                                                                                     
“employment promotion fixed term contract”, which had to last at least for 6 months and could be 
renewed up to 3 years. After this maximum period, the firm had to offer a permanent contract; if 
this were not done, the vacancy could not be filled by another temporary worker. 
40 A non negligible share of workers with fixed-term contracts remains in this situation one year 
later. This percentage has tended to increase during the period 1987-2001: from around 55% and 
45% to nearly 70% and 65% for males and females, respectively.  
41 In 1994, the “employment promotion fixed-term contract” was restricted to some specific 
groups (workers over 45 and long term unemployed) whereas the “causality principle” was to 
apply to the “standard” fixed-term contracts. The 1997 reform entailed the complete elimination of 
the “employment promotion fixed-term contract” and the approval of a new contract on permanent 
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lowered significantly the share of temporary contracts since the mid 1990s. Two 
aspects regarding the effects of these reforms deserve further attention: i) the 
lifting in 1994 of a minimum time limit on the duration of fixed-term contracts 
seems to have induced employers to roll over an increasingly large number of 
contracts for shorter periods of time, leading to growing contract turnover42; ii) 
during the last ten years the share of temporary contracts in the private sector 
employment has recorded a significant decline (from nearly 40% in 1995 to 32% 
in 2002) while the share in public employment recorded a sharp rise (from 15% to 
around 22% in the same years). The reduction in the private sector is generally 
explained by the successful introduction of the new permanent contract in 1997 
(see box 5.1). The lower dismissal costs and the social security contribution 
rebates offered by the new contract have worked as incentives to promote 
employment on a permanent basis43. In contrast, the increase registered in the 
public sector was due to the budgetary restrictions imposed in the second half of 
the 90s on the replacement of civil service vacancies. 
 
Overall, fixed-term contracts have been instrumental in increasing employment in 
Spain. Such contracts have enhanced labour flexibility to deal with changing 
economic conditions while facilitating a higher outflow from unemployment 
(Dolado et al, 2002). This has benefited some specific groups of workers, mainly 
low skilled, and is clearly a better option than remaining unemployed (Estrada, 
García-Perea and Izquierdo, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, a high segmentation between permanent and temporary workers 
might imply negative spillovers on human capital investment. The generalised use 
of fixed term contracts coupled with a high turnover rate of temporary jobs gives 
little incentive either for employers or workers to invest in human capital. In this 
regard, Dolado et al. (1999) estimate that the probability of receiving on-the-job 
training is significantly lower for workers with fixed-term contracts.  
 
Furthermore, a disproportionate use of fixed-term contracts results in a reducd 
overall labour mobility. A temporary nature, inherent uncertainty, and lower 
remuneration, coupled with high housing prices, are characteristics of fixed-term 
contracts hampering mobility. This is especially relevant since the share of 
temporary contracts is the highest among young workers who should be more 
mobile geographically (Dolado et al., 2002). Moreover, Toharia and Malo (2000) 
                                                                                                                                     
basis with lower dismissals costs. Finally, in 2001 dismissals costs for temporary contracts (8 days 
per year worked) were introduced. 
42 Thus, in 2002 there were approximately 13 million fixed-term contracts of which around 30% 
were to last less than one month and nearly 45% less than three months. By contrast, the 
restoration of the link with the temporary needs of the firm does not seem to have prevented 
employers from continuing to resort to “ordinary” fixed-term contracts for covering permanent 
activities (i.e. breaching the causality principle). 
43 It is, however, unclear whether the success of these contracts is due to the lower dismissal costs 
or to the direct social security rebates. The latter aspect might be crucial in order to explain their 
success. 
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stress the role played by the high share of temporary contracts in explaining the 
low fertility rates registered in Spain in the recent past. 
 
According to the negative effects that such a high degree of segmentation entails, 
its reduction becomes a priority. As for policy recommendations, four kinds of 
actions can be identified. Firstly, given the success in promoting employment on a 
permanent basis achieved by the new open ended contract with lower firing costs 
introduced in 1997, further steps in this direction appear advisable. Secondly, 
despite the recent implementation of some legal mechanisms of control, fixed-
term contracts are often used beyond their legal purpose of covering temporary 
needs of firms. Therefore, a closer monitoring of the use of fixed-term contracts 
might be appropriate. Thirdly, measures targeted at promoting part-time contracts 
should help reduce the share of temporary contracts while promoting female 
participation. Apart from these horizontal measures, the considerable 
concentration of fixed-term contracts in some particular sectors may call for 
specific policy measures addressed to these activity branches, namely 
construction. Finally, a reform of wage-setting oriented to better reflect 
productivity developments across regions and economic circumstances at the firm 
level jointly with a further review of the employment protection legislation would 
help sustain employment growth. 
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 5. Labour productivity 
 
 
This chapter analyses the factors behind labour productivity growth in Spain, the 
main characteristic of which is a significant slowdown since the eighties. Labour 
productivity grew in Spain at an annual average rate of 0.7 between 1995 and 
2003, which compares with 0.9% in the euro area. Available data suggest that 
such a productivity growth slowdown should be mainly attributed to low total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth. Moreover, in spite of growth rates similar to 
those in the euro area, the level of the capital-labour ratio in Spain is much lower. 
This reflects the high share of some labour-intensive activities with low content of 
human and knowledge capital. 
 
Low TFP growth registered in Spain is the result of a number of structural 
factors, including low educational attainment of the labour force, coupled with 
insufficient provision of vocational training. Furthermore, resources allocated to 
R&D activities are scarce by European standards, and the relative weight of 
information and communication technologies is also lower than in the EU.  
 
High job creation is indeed paramount to real convergence in the short to medium 
term. However, in the long run, real convergence can only be ensured through 
high productivity growth and, more specifically, through high TFP growth. 
Although the ingredients necessary to increase TFP growth are relatively well-
known, the recipe is rather ambiguous about quantities. Consequently, it is rather 
difficult to set productivity growth targets associated specific policies. Overall, 
such measures strongly interplay with other factors and measures, which makes 
difficult to assess their effects ex-ante. Nevertheless, it appears crucial to improve 
the functioning of product and labour markets, as well as to invest more in human 
capital and to allocate more public and private resources to R&D activities. 
Moreover, given its positive spillovers, a more widespread ICT use and diffusion 
would help raise productivity in Spain.  
 
5.1 Down the road 
The recent remarkable achievements in terms of job creation and unemployment 
reduction have not been accompanied by sound productivity growth (Figure 26). 
Labour productivity grew by 0.7% in Spain in the period 1995-2003, compared 
with 0.9% in the euro area. These figures implied a slowdown with respect to the 
period 1985-1995, when labour productivity grew by 1.4% and 1.6% on average 
in Spain and the euro area, respectively. As a result, labour productivity per hour 
worked in Spain is only approximately 85% of the euro area average. Therefore, 
the GDP per capita convergence experienced by the Spanish economy since the 
mid 1990s mainly relied on a more intensive use of labour.  
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Figure 26: Labour productivity growth in Spain and the euro area (annual 
growth rates) 
Source: AMECO
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A trade-off between labour productivity growth and employment rate seems to 
exist in Spain (see Herce, 2004). Figure 27 displays three expansionary periods, 
namely 1960-1974, 1985-1991 and the most recent one 1994-200344. While in the 
first period, increases in GDP per capita were achieved by sharp productivity 
increases coupled with almost negligible employment reductions45, in the other 
two periods, increases in the employment rate are registered at the expense of 
much lower productivity growth. Furthermore, the intense employment 
destruction during the period 1974-1985, due to industrial restructuring, was 
accompanied by high labour productivity growth, leaving GDP per capita barely 
changed46. Simultaneous steep increases of both labour productivity and 
employment rates have not been observed in Spain in the last forty years. 
 
A similar trade-off seems to exist in the euro area (see Sapir et al., 2003), although 
to a lesser extent than in Spain. In particular, employment destruction between 
1974 and 1985 was less intense in the euro area than in Spain. Contrary to the 
European pattern, the USA does not seem to show such a trade-off. This could 
suggest that the productivity-employment trade-off could stem from the relative 
malfunctioning of European labour markets. Labour productivity developments 
depend on capital intensity and total factor productivity47. The next two 
                                                 
44 Right-upward movements imply increases in GDP per capita. 
45 In this first period, slight employment rate reduction was accompanied by a high migration 
flows mainly to other EU countries.  
46 A similar although less acute movement took place during the 1993 recession.  
47 Assuming a standard production function: [ ]ttLtKFtY ),(),()( =  
with K, L and t being Capital, Employment and time, respectively. Differentiating and taking 
logarithms, yields  
.
log)1(log TFP
L
Kdw
L
Yd K +−=  
where (1-wk) is the share of labour in Y, and TFP is total factor productivity growth.  
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subsections analyse such driving forces of labour productivity. Special attention 
will be paid to the determinants of TFP. 
 
Figure 27: Decomposition of GDP per capita (1960-2003) 
Source: AMECO
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5.2. Give labour some more capital 
Since the 60s Spain has benefited from an intense process of capital accumulation 
linked to a fast process of industrialisation and modernisation of the productive 
structure. More recently, as mentioned in chapter 2, since the accession to the EU 
and until 1992, large FDI inflows led net capital stock to grow well above the 
main EU economies48. During the 1993 recession capital accumulation slowed 
down significantly, although still exceeding the rates registered in the largest EU 
countries. Prospects associated with EMU membership contributed to sustaining 
and even widening the differential in capital accumulation rates from 1997 
onwards. The recent economic slowdown does not seem to have modified this 
picture.  
 
In spite of faster capital accumulation than in the European countries in the last 
years, the capital stock per person employed grew at similar rates, at around 1%, 
in Spain and the EU in the period 1995-2003 (Figure 28)49. This compares with 
1.9% in the USA. As a result, the capital-labour ratio in Spain remains well below 
the USA (59%) and of the euro area, 67% in 2003. The relatively low capital-
                                                 
48 Between 1960 and 1985, FDI inflows represented 0.5% of GDP on average. After the accession 
to the EU and until the early 1990s recession, FDI grew significantly reaching more than 2% of 
GDP in 1990. Since 1995, FDI increased again and in some years has stood at around 5% of GDP. 
It is worth noting that in net terms, since the late 1990s Spanish FDI abroad is higher than FDI 
inflows (Fernández-Otheo, 2003). 
49 In contrast, the capital-labour ratio growth averaged 2.0% in Spain during the period 1985-1995. 
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labour ratio in Spain reflects a high share of labour intensive activities, notably 
tourism and construction, in total gross value added. 
 
Figure 28: Capital stock per person employed (annual growth rate) 
Source: AMECO
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5.3. Not much technology in it 
The recent slowdown recorded by labour productivity since 1995 in Spain relative 
to the euro area does not therefore come from capital accumulation, but from the 
low growth of total factor productivity (TFP). While in the period 1985-1995 TFP 
growth averaged 0.7% in Spain, it dwindled to 0.3% between 1995 and 2003. 
Something similar happened in the euro area: from an average growth of 1.2% 
between 1985 and 1995 it decelerated to 0.5% since 1995. Thus, although 
decelerating sharply in both cases, TFP growth in Spain remains half of the euro 
area (see Figure 29). A number of structural factors determine the evolution of 
productivity (see Barro, 1997, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, or Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998). Among them, we consider here human capital, training, research 
and development, the incorporation of information and communication 
technologies, the productive structure and the composition of imports. These two 
latter factors are discussed in the next section. 
 
Specifically, the 2003-2005 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for Spain 
(European Commission, 2003b) highlight the need to support growth by 
increasing productivity through encouraging R&D and human capital formation 
and enhancing competition. Accordingly, the specific recommendations addressed 
to Spain are: a) step up efforts to increase skilled human capital, business 
involvement in R&D and innovation, and ICT diffusion; and b) Continue to take 
measures to strengthen competition in certain sectors, such as electricity and retail 
trade, and to reduce the administrative burden on business establishment. These 
elements will be analysed in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
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Figure 29: Total factor productivity growth 
Source: AMECO
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Human capital accumulation  
 
Although having progressed fast in the last decade50, educational attainment in 
Spain (measured by the percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having 
completed at least upper secondary education) is still below the EU average 
(63.4% as against 74% in the EU-15 in 2003) and public spending in education as 
a percentage of GDP remains among the lowest in the EU, 4.5% in 2000, which 
compares with almost 5% in the EU-15 (see European Commission, 2003b). As a 
result, the educational attainment of the working age population is lower in Spain 
than in other large EU economies (see Figure 30). In particular, secondary 
education, the educational level with largest impact on economic growth (Barro, 
1997, and Aghion and Howitt, 1998), is significantly below the euro area 
average51. Additionally, according to the PISA 2003 report (OECD, 2004b) based 
on achievements of 15 year old students, the quality of secondary school in Spain 
is significantly below the OECD average.  
 
 
                                                 
50 Moral and Hurtado (2003) show that employment in Spain has increased its “quality content” in 
recent years due to the higher educational attainment and work experience (age) of Spanish 
workers while employment growth composition has tended to lower labour quality because of the 
expansion of the less productive sectors. 
51 The proportion of adults with upper-secondary school is only slightly more than half of the 
OECD average (OECD, 2003). 
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Figure 30: Working age population and educational level (%) 
Source: EUROSTAT
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Vocational training 
 
In order to improve productivity, labour skills are of major importance. A skilful 
workforce allows for management improvements, cost reduction, and greater 
sophistication and ability to incorporate new technologies. In Spain the share of 
workers with secondary education is relatively low. Additionally, skills do not 
always match firms’ requirements. This mismatch is partially explained by a less 
developed vocational training in Spain than in other advanced economies: only 
31% of students in upper secondary school in Spain follow vocational training 
compared to an average of 41% in the OECD area (OECD, 2003)52. This situation 
is to some extent caused by the lack of social reputation of vocational training, 
which in Spain is perceived as a secondary option for the “less brilliant students”. 
Moreover, as said before, the large share of temporary contracts provides little 
incentives for investing in human capital. Overall, the educational system should 
be reoriented so as to cope with the professional skills demanded by firms.  
 
Research and development 
 
R&D can have a significant impact on productivity and long-run economic 
growth (OECD, 2002b). Although the tax credit scheme for promoting R&D 
activities in Spain is the most generous in the OECD area53, innovation and 
expenditure on R&D are among the lowest in Europe, and further efforts should 
be pursued so as to promote quality and product differentiation. This could be 
partly explained by the fact that the legal background is unclear on which cases 
                                                 
52 Likewise, after upper secondary school, only 41% of students in Spain join advanced vocational 
training while this percentage reach 58% in the EU. However, in clear contrast with these figures, 
employability of vocational training graduates is higher than workers with a university degree 
(OECD, 2003). 
53 One third of expenditure on R&D by large companies is recovered, which is the highest share 
among the OECD countries and almost twice as high as the second country ranked (OECD, 2003). 
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are prone to qualify for such tax credits. Despite recent progress in the last years, 
R&D expenditures in Spain amount to around 1% of GDP, which is below half of 
the euro area average54. Specifically, low expenditure in R&D activities is 
translated into fewer patents. Only 24 patents per million inhabitants were 
registered in 2001 compared to 161 in the EU-15.  
 
On the other hand, the banking system is the main channel that provides funds for 
new investment projects. In this regard, the big banks’ business involvement is 
closer to more traditional activities such as construction, electricity and chemistry, 
which in general are characterised by comparatively low technological content.  
However, the insufficient degree of expansion of risk-capital funds constitutes a 
big obstacle for most innovative projects to develop. The absence of a deep capital 
market hampers the embracement of innovative but risky medium-large size 
projects in the long term.    
 
The 2005 budget, echoes the need of promoting high value-added activities and 
increasing spending on R&D activities in order to underpin productivity growth. 
In fact, funds devoted to these policies increase by more than 25% with respect to 
the previous year. The bulk of such funds are allocated to subsidies and direct 
financing of research projects. Notwithstanding the sharp increase, public funds 
devoted to R&D activities only amount to around 0.5% of GDP.  
 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) 
 
It is also paramount to pursue further efforts on ICT take-up: 29.5% of households 
had internet access at home in 2002 as against 38.9% in the EU-15. The share of 
both gross value added and per capita expenditure on ICT activities stands below 
75% of the EU-15 average. Although these latter activities have contributed to 
increase productivity growth significantly in the late-nineties (see Hernando and 
Núñez, 2002), their contribution to productivity growth is still well below the 
USA and could largely be improved. ICT diffusion is especially important since it 
allows for new technology dissemination and quick information processing while 
contributing to reducing production, coordination and distribution costs in mature 
sectors. Finally, a wide use of ICT improves the ability to respond to demand 
changes and thus reinforce competitiveness via other elements different from 
prices (see for instance European Commission, 2001c). 
 
5.4. All inclusive but chips 
Behind the labour productivity developments lies a particular production structure 
that determines growth and performance in international markets. The most 
remarkable feature of the breakdown by branches of total gross value added in 
                                                 
54 This applies to both private and public sector. For the former, business R&D expenditure in 
Spain represents 0.5% of GDP approximately compared to 1% in the euro area. For the public 
sector, expenditure on R&D is also comparatively low: 0.4% and 0.6% of GDP for Spain and the 
euro area respectively. 
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Spain shows a clear increase of construction linked to the buoyant residential 
investment that differs clearly from the fall or stabilisation of this activity in other 
European economies. On the other hand, the share of manufacturing remains 
below those of the largest EU countries, and its fall in the last years is in 
accordance with the trends observed in the EU (Figure 31). 
 
It is worth noting the higher importance of agriculture and construction in Spain, 
coupled with the relatively low share of services and, to a lesser extent, 
manufactures. Both agriculture and construction are labour intensive activities, 
characterised by low productivity growth and low-skilled labour requirements. In 
particular, a high concentration of job creation in low productivity sectors has 
been observed since the mid-nineties. In addition to market services, as explained 
in detail in chapter 2, construction has experienced an unprecedented expansion 
and employment in this sector has risen well above other activities (Figure 32). 
This phenomenon has also contributed to the overall productivity slowdown 
observed in the recent past. 
 
Figure 31: Composition of Gross Value Added 
Source: AMECO
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Furthermore, the share of services linked to tourism activities, where unskilled 
labour is dominant and productivity gains are also poor, is much higher than in the 
rest of the countries considered and in the EU as a whole. According to the 
Tourism Satellite Account, tourism represented around 12% of total GVA in 
1999. Therefore, branches of low productivity levels are relatively more important 
in terms of gross value added in Spain than in other European countries.  
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Figure 32: Employment growth by sectors in Spain (1995=100) 
Source: AMECO
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Industry, in line with other advanced countries, accounts for slightly above 20% 
of total GVA. But its importance goes beyond these figures, notably due to its 
induced effects on the rest of the economy. In particular, manufacturing is crucial 
as far as production and absorption of new technologies are concerned. Therefore, 
its composition and evolution largely affects total factor productivity growth.  
 
In the last years a tendency to reduce the share of low-technology goods to 
European standards and to increase the share of medium-high technology ones is 
observed. As regards high technology goods, however, the gap with the EU has 
widened further as production and exports of such products in the EU grew faster 
than in Spain.  
 
Moreover, some sectors are made up of a large number of small and medium 
sized companies with low innovative capacity55. Other sectors are dominated by 
few firms involving a low degree of competition (electricity, petrol distribution, 
some telecommunication branches, etc.), which might discourage innovation. 
 
Consequently, the Spanish productive structure seems to be focused on low 
productive branches and mature sectors where productivity gains are low and with 
moderate growth of world demand, while real convergence requires efforts to 
improve productivity. Means and policies to be implemented in order to reach 
such an objective are not obvious and their effects will take some time before 
being perceived. Nevertheless, it appears crucial to improve product and labour 
market functioning so as to raise skilled human capital and resources allocated to 
R&D activities through both public and private sectors. Finally, a more 
widespread ICT diffusion is advisable given its positive spillovers.  
 
                                                 
55 Nearly 75% of Spanish firms have 10 or less workers. 
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Shopping technology 
 
Spanish imports of manufactures are largely concentrated on middle-high 
technology goods56. This is due to the growing importance of intra-industry trade 
in this segment of the productive structure between Spain and its main EU trade 
partners. In contrast, the recent evolution of high-technology imports shows that 
the technological gap with the EU has widened further (Figure 33). Given that 
imports are also an important factor enhancing technological diffusion and 
absorption, especially in countries like Spain with a low degree of innovation, the 
recent evolution of high-technology imports is a matter of concern (Gordo et al., 
2003).  
 
Figure 33: Imports structure in 2001 by technological intensity 
Source: Gordo et al. (2003)
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56 This category includes machinery and mechanical equipment, motor vehicles, chemical products 
except chemistry, railway equipment and other transport machinery. Thus, although entailing 
spillovers mainly on some manufacturing industries, these imports barely affect ICT diffusion.   
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 6. Price developments and competitiveness 
 
 
A main goal of this chapter is to analyses the causes and economic implications of 
the relatively large inflation differential of Spain with the euro area. Although 
cyclical and monetary conditions play a non-negligible role, the inflation 
differential in Spain appears to a large extent associated with structural factors. 
Low productivity growth, coupled with rigidities in some markets, are key 
elements behind the persistent higher inflation.  
 
Inflation differentials are deteriorating Spanish competitiveness by appreciating 
the real effective exchange rate and eroding mark-ups in the tradable sector. 
Therefore, liberalising measures undertaken in the recent past may help alleviate 
inflation pressures. However, they need to be complemented by measures aiming 
at increasing effective competition through a deeper process of market 
deregulation, particularly in services sectors.  
 
Such measures, coupled with those aiming to raise productivity growth, should 
lead by new production and export specialisation patterns increasingly based on 
quality and product differentiation. This would reduce the price elasticity of 
exports and help maintain, or even improve, the external competitiveness. 
Otherwise, stronger competition coupled with persistent inflation differentials 
may end up by magnifying current external imbalances of the Spanish economy. 
 
6.1. The role of prices 
The traditional comparative advantages that Spain has enjoyed since the accession 
to the EU, based on low production costs and price levels, seem to be fading away 
as a result of cumulated inflation differentials. Before 1998, appreciations of the 
real exchange rate were offset by currency devaluations, which helped restore 
competitiveness, especially during the first half of the nineties (Bravo y Gordo, 
2003). However, since accession to EMU, the exchange rate is not a policy 
instrument anymore and inflation differentials result in competitiveness losses. 
 
Although since the late 1980s, when Spain joined the ERM, tighter monetary 
policy has led inflation rates to converge to those in the EU, significant inflation 
differentials vis-à-vis the euro area still persist and, according to the Commission 
Autumn 2004 forecast, are foreseen to remain in the medium term (see Figure 34). 
While the annual average inflation rate in the euro area between 1998 and 2003 
was 1.8%, the rate registered in Spain amounted to 3.0%. Inflation differentials 
entail constant pressure on costs, and competitiveness losses. In order to design 
the most appropriate economic policy, is essential to know the sources of such 
differentials. This chapter analyses the nature of the inflationary pressures in 
Spain and the associated risks for the Spanish growth model.  
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Figure 34: Inflation rates Spain versus the euro area, 1995-2005 
Source: INE, AMECO and New Cronos
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6.2. Determinants of inflation differentials across countries 
A number of different factors can determine inflation differentials in a monetary 
union. Depending on their nature, inflation differentials can be considered as 
“benign” or “malign”. The first category comprises: i) cyclical divergences, which 
can be considered benign since inflation differentials help restore equilibrium 
after an asymmetric shock; ii) Balassa-Samuelson effects, according to which 
inflation differentials reflect equilibrium-restoring factors stemming from 
different productivity growth between the tradables and non-tradables; and iii) 
price level convergence, associated with real convergence enhanced by price 
transparency and market arbitrage.  
 
“Malign” inflation differentials, which tend to accentuate economic imbalances, 
are related to structural and institutional features of the economy, such as the 
wage setting process and the functioning of product markets (mark-ups).  
 
Cyclical factors: Inflation rates are affected by the cyclical position of the 
country. For instance, positive output gaps would imply higher inflation on a 
temporary basis. Since EMU enhances synchronization of national business 
cycles, the importance of inflation differentials of a cyclical nature will diminish 
over time (Egert et al, 2004).  
 
Balassa-Samuelson effects: According to the well-known Balassa-Samuelson57 
effects, lower productivity growth in sheltered activities, combined with 
productivity in the open sector growing faster than in the rest of the world, would 
result, ceteris paribus, in higher inflation rates accompanying catch-up in income 
levels58. This is the case of catching-up countries, where real economic 
                                                 
57 Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). 
58 Under the assumption of a certain degree of wage equalisation across sectors, faster productivity 
growth in tradables pushes wages up for the whole economy, which in turn leads to higher 
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convergence goes hand in hand with positive inflation differentials. However, 
empirical evidence indicates that the Balassa-Samuelson effects may not be large. 
Honohan and Lane (2003) find evidence of a weak Balassa-Samuelson effect in 
EMU. Lommatzsch and Tober (2003) also find weak effects in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. 
 
Price level convergence: In catching-up countries, real convergence would lead to 
a redistribution of consumption towards goods and services with higher income 
elasticity. This would push inflation up, in particular in the services sector. 
Moreover, as shown by Rogers (2001, 2002), EMU is expected to further boost 
price convergence through a higher inflation rate in those countries with lower 
price level. These elements can be especially relevant for Spain, which records a 
per capita income slightly above 85% of the EU-15 average and a general price 
level among the lowest. 
 
Structural factors:  By distinguishing between the open and the sheltered sector of 
the economy, inflation in the latter will be higher the higher the difference in unit 
labour costs between both sectors and the lower the mark-up in the open sector 
(Canzoneri et al, 2002). Therefore, persistent inflation differentials are closely 
associated with the functioning of the labour market, the degree of competition in 
product markets and productivity performance. Persistent differences in these 
elements across countries will entail different relative price tendencies.  
 
Such structural factors, namely labour and product market rigidities, interact with 
Balassa-Samuelson effects and price level convergence, exacerbating inflation 
differentials across countries. As a result, inflation may not exclusively be due to 
higher productivity growth in the open sector, and persistent inflation differentials 
stemming from market rigidities and malfunctioning may threaten convergence 
and competitiveness in the medium term (Alberola and Tyrväinen, 1998). 
 
6.3. Spanish-EU inflation differentials: Where is the culprit? 
It was not the output gap 
 
Where Spain-euro area inflation differentials are concerned, differences in 
cyclical positions are only one element among the rest. Moreover, in the recent 
past the output gaps have been similar in Spain and in the euro area. For instance, 
in 2002 the output gap in Spain was 0.5% of trend GDP, which compares with 
0.6% in the euro area. Therefore, differences in the cyclical position may only 
give a very partial explanation of the higher inflation rate in Spain. 
 
In the recent past relatively low nominal interest rates in the euro area may have 
fuelled domestic demand in Spain. While during the previous slowdown in 1993 
                                                                                                                                     
inflation in non-tradables, where productivity growth cannot keep pace with nominal wages. 
Within this framework, dual inflation between tradable and non tradable sectors would be a natural 
consequence. 
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nominal interest rates were at around 15% in Spain, at present they record values 
close to 2%. Similarly, real interest rates were around 10% at that time and have 
recorded negative values since the second half of 2002. This has boosted credit 
growth, especially for mortgages, underpinning demand for housing and putting 
further pressure on prices. However, looser monetary conditions in Spain than in 
the euro area are a very partial explanation of inflation differentials. Although to a 
lesser extent, other countries have also enjoyed relatively loose monetary 
conditions since 1998 without recording as high inflation differentials as in Spain. 
Different responses to a common monetary policy can only be due to the presence 
of idiosyncratic elements, which condition the monetary policy stance. Therefore, 
differences in either the monetary stance or the cyclical position do not seem to 
account per se for the observed inflation differential in Spain. Higher inflation 
expectations linked to the structural and institutional features of the Spanish 
economy seem to be behind persistent inflation (Ledo et al., 2002). Therefore, in 
order to properly assess the nature of the inflation differentials between Spain and 
the euro area structural factor must be brought to the forum.  
 
Do not blame the unions 
 
One notable feature of the Spanish economy in the last twenty years has been the 
continuous fall of inflationary expectations and the slow but gradual 
accommodation of agents' behaviour to the new economic setting. Despite this, 
nominal unit labour costs (ULCs) have continued to record higher growth rates in 
Spain than in the euro area. Hard data suggest that the functioning of the labour 
market, albeit one of the usual suspects, is not one of the main culprits. 
 
Figure 35: Wages, nominal ULC and RULC evolution 
Source: AMECO
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A new wage growth pattern has emerged since the mid-1990s, which was further 
underpinned by the stable macroeconomic framework of EMU. As a result, the 
wage differential with the euro area has narrowed significantly (Figure 35) and, in 
parallel, relative wage inflation between tradables and non-tradables has 
converged in the last years (Figure 36). Therefore, the still remaining gap in unit 
labour costs has to be mainly found in poorer labour productivity developments 
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rather than in insufficient wage moderation. In other words, as compared with the 
euro area, the Spanish labour market does not seem to embed especially tight 
rigidities. Moreover, real ULCs have registered negative growth rates in the last 
years and, therefore, real wages have been growing below labour productivity. 
Although also observed in the euro area, this behaviour has been especially acute 
in Spain. 
 
However, some labour market institutions may still be a source of inflation 
tensions. This appears to be the case for wage indexation. In Spain, indexation 
clauses are still applied to almost half of the workers. Backward-looking wage 
indexation introduces distortions in the functioning of the labour market and 
contributes to inflation persistence, especially when there exist high and persistent 
inflation differentials with the euro area. Moreover, at the current juncture, when 
inflation is rising due to external shocks, indexation clauses can magnify the 
effect and persistence of such shocks. In this respect, the substitution of 
indexation by other bargaining mechanisms including a closer link between wage 
increases and productivity growth would lead to more efficient results. However, 
such pervasive effects of indexation may have been more important in the past 
than at present. While indexation was largely responsible for the episodes of high 
inflation in Spain during the two oil price shocks, its current impact on inflation 
developments is likely to be much milder59 . 
 
Figure 36: Relative compensation per employee (non-tradables vs tradables) 
Source: AMECO
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Where are you, productivity? 
 
As shown in chapter 5, labour productivity growth is lower in Spain than in the 
euro area, and has contributed to the persistently higher inflation in Spain. In 
addition, average labour productivity growth in manufacturing in the period 1996-
2003 was also lower in Spain than in the euro area: 0.9% compared with 2.0%, 
                                                 
59 In fact, wage increases agreed through collective bargaining are lower when indexation clauses 
are present. Izquierdo et. al. (2003) provide evidence on this statement. 
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respectively (see table 10). Apart from Italy, labour productivity for 
manufacturing in Spain is also lower than in the largest and more advanced EU 
economies. Hence, Balassa-Samuelson effects do not seem to be behind the 
Spanish higher inflation (Box 8). 
 
Table 10: Labour productivity growth. Manufacturing 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 96-03
DE N/A N/A 5.6 -0.6 8.5 2.6 -0.2 5.0 1.7 -0.9 3.6 -0.6 2.0 2.9 1.7
ES -0.7 3.2 3.0 1.6 3.7 2.1 -1.0 2.2 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.6 3.1 1.0
FR 1.2 2.4 3.8 0.5 7.9 4.8 0.8 5.9 5.0 3.7 3.3 1.9 2.5 1.8 3.1
IT 0.5 1.7 4.4 0.6 6.0 3.6 -0.6 2.8 -0.4 0.3 2.9 0.0 -1.9 -1.2 0.3
UK 3.3 4.2 7.1 5.1 3.4 -0.8 -0.1 1.7 1.0 4.6 5.5 2.3 0.4 4.4 2.5
US 0.3 0.8 4.9 2.5 5.6 5.6 3.5 6.0 4.4 5.5 6.8 -1.3 10.2 6.8 5.2
EUR-12 (1) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.3 4.6 2.0 1.1 3.7 0.4 1.7 2.0 2.0
EUR-15 (2) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.3 4.4 2.0 1.9 4.3 0.6 1.8 2.5 2.2
1) At 1995 exchange rates; Euro area
2) At 1995 exchange rates; Former EU-15
Source AMECO  
 
 
Box 8: Balassa-Samuelson estimates for Spain in the literature 
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 As shown in the table below, the recent literature suggests that Balassa-Samuelson effects on
Spanish inflation have become less important over time (sample period getting closer to EMU).
For instance, Canzoneri et al. (2002) find that around 1.5 percentage points of the Spanish
inflation rate were due to such effects in the period 1973-1991/97. In contrast, more recently
Lommatzsch and Tober (2003) estimate a more modest Balassa-Samuelson effect since 1995
(less than 0.5 percentage points). 
 
 Inflation due to B-S 
effect 
Average Inflation 
Alberola and Tyrväinen (1998)   
1975-1993 3.1 11.6 
1985-1993 3.5 6.4 
Sinn and Reutter (2001)   
1987-1995 1.5 5.5 
Canzoneri et al. (2002)   
1973-1991 1.5 12.5 
1973-1997 1.4 10.5 
Lommatzsch and Tober (2003)   
1995-2002 0.4 3.1  
arking up the inflation race   
ow productivity growth in tradables, particularly when coupled with distortions 
n product markets, allow producers to discriminate prices, contributing to 
nflation stickiness (Andrés et al., 2003). Persistently higher inflation in Spain is 
pparently due to faster growth of mark-ups in services coupled with a poor 
roductivity growth in the open sector, thus constituting a systematic deviation 
74
from the Balassa-Samuelson paradigm. The reasons behind high mark-up growth 
are to be found mainly in the functioning of product markets. 
 
Álvarez et al. (2003) provide evidence on the effects of market structure on 
inflation. Since 1995, mark-ups in services have been increasing in contrast with 
moderate growth of unit labour costs, putting pressure on prices of services. In 
parallel, the income convergence process has led to a demand shift towards the 
service activities with higher income elasticities, pushing prices up further in these 
branches60. 
 
As for branches of activity, the inflation differential appears to a large extent in 
services. Specifically, transport, services related to renting of dwellings, 
restaurants and hotels and some professional services, such as health care, register 
the highest inflation differentials with the euro area. 
 
As a result, in spite of cyclical and monetary conditions playing a non-negligible 
role, the inflation differential in Spain seems to be caused to a significant extent 
by structural factors. Income convergence, higher wage growth coupled with 
lower productivity growth than in the euro area and the presence of product 
market rigidities in some sectors are key elements behind the persistent higher 
inflation. Therefore, cumulated inflation differentials might eventually jeopardise 
Spanish competitiveness by an appreciation of the effective real exchange rate and 
eroding mark-ups in the tradable sector. In this regard, liberalisation initiatives 
undertaken in the recent past may alleviate inflation pressures. However, they 
need to be complemented by measures aiming at increasing effective competition 
through a deeper process of market deregulation. Furthermore, efforts devoted to 
increasing labour productivity growth should contribute to narrowing the 
currently sluggish differential. 
 
6.4. Competitiveness. A dangerous position? 
Exports and imports of goods represent around 20% and 25% of GDP, and 
manufacturing is by far the main good traded (nearly 80%). While the healthy 
growth rates of exports of goods in the second half of 1990s are largely explained 
by the complete integration of the Spanish economy in the European single 
market and the devaluations of the peseta, the slowdown observed since 2000 
might be partially explained by price competitiveness losses registered in the 
latest years, the pattern of export specialisation and the high dependency on 
intra-EU markets61 (Bravo y Gordo, 2003 illustrate these aspects). 
 
The more common price and cost competitiveness indicators clearly show a 
gradual deterioration in the competitive situation of the Spanish economy 
                                                 
60  Additional evidence on this issue is provided by Ortega (2003) and Estrada and Lopez Salido 
(2004). 
61 Similarly to total export figures, exports of goods grew by more than 10% on average in the 
period 1996-1999 compared to an average growth rate below 5% during 2000-2003. 
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vis-à-vis its main trade partners since 1995 (see Figure 37). Specifically, since 
1995, Spanish competitiveness, measured by the evolution of export prices 
relative to either the euro area or the main industrialised countries, has 
deteriorated by 10%. When competitiveness is measured by using unit labour 
costs in manufacturing, which is close to the concept of tradable goods, the 
deterioration turns out to be above 16% relative to the euro area. This 
deterioration has almost offset the competitiveness gains obtained through the 
devaluations that took place in the first half of the nineties (see European 
Commission, 2004a, for more details). 
 
These price competitiveness losses are particularly relevant given that export price 
elasticities in Spain seem to be above the EMU average (see Buisan and 
Caballero, 2003) and can partially explain the modest performance of the Spanish 
exports of goods in the most recent past62. A high price elasticity of exports is the 
consequence of a particular pattern of trade specialisation, which, in turn, is 
coherent with the patterns of production specialisation showed in the previous 
section. Overall, Spanish exports of manufactures concentrate on products with 
low degree of technological sophistication and limited degree of product 
differentiation, which, therefore, are more influenced by price competitiveness63. 
Moreover, as shown by Bravo and García (2004), Spanish exports of 
manufactures are specialised in “mature” activities whose international demand is 
less vigorous, namely average technology goods (at around 52% of the Spanish 
exports of manufactures) and low technology products (around 20%).  
 
Figure 37: Price competitiveness indicators of Spain versus the euro area 
(1995=100) 
Source: AMECO
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62 Buisan and Caballero (2003) also point to a higher income elasticity of Spanish exports than in 
other EU countries. This would be the result of the recent and rapid process of openness of the 
Spanish economy and should tend to moderate gradually. 
63 This is closely linked to the shrinkage observed in the margins of manufacturing-exporting 
sector in order to keep market shares. 
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Specifically, exports of motor vehicles represent at around 25% of total exports of 
goods. These are included in the middle-high category and are closely linked to 
the presence of export-oriented multinational corporations. This high degree of 
export-specialisation in a branch leaves Spanish trade highly exposed to external 
sector-specific shocks. Machinery and equipment (above 10%) and chemical 
products (above 15% of total exports) and electrical and electronic goods (above 
10%) are also main export sources. On the other hand, medium-low and low 
technology activities such as textiles, clothing and footwear (at around 6%), 
processed and non processed food (above 15%) and wood and paper (above 5% of 
the total) are also predominant in total exports.     
 
Moreover, the negative gap between Spanish imports and exports of high-
technology goods, for which the world demand is most dynamic, has widened. 
This specialisation pattern is similar to that in some new Member States, although 
the latter have significantly lower production costs. Furthermore, destination 
markets are also far from been the most dynamic ones, Far East Asian countries, 
which prevents Spain from making the most of world growth. 
 
Exports and imports of services represent 9% and 5 % of GDP respectively. 
Tourism accounts for more than 50% of services exports and 15% of services 
imports. While other services (transports, services to companies etc) have 
traditionally registered a deficit, tourism has generated important surpluses at 
around 4% of GDP, playing an important role in sustaining economic growth in 
Spain in the latest decades. 
 
Spain is the second largest tourist destination in the world with about 50 million 
arrivals, only behind France (75 millions), and collects 7% of world tourism 
revenues (Martínez and Andrés, 2003). Although still dynamic, tourism and travel 
sectors are not free from threats, and since 2000 the relative economic 
performance of these sectors in terms of contribution to GDP growth has 
worsened significantly.   
 
Figure 38: Tourism industry trends in Spain 
Source: INE and IET
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Inflation differentials and the appreciation of the euro in the last years could have 
contributed to deteriorating the competitive position of this sector. In turn, more 
than 90% of tourists arriving in Spain come from other EU member States, which 
given the economic slowdown in the largest EU economies, is a major factor 
behind the stagnation in the number of tourists in the latest years as well as the 
declining ratio of expenditure per tourist (see Figure 38). 
 
Other factors, by nature more structural, help also explain the less brilliant 
performance of tourism since 2000. In particular, the supply of tourist services 
with similar characteristics in other countries with lower costs has widened 
considerably in the last decade64. This stronger competition along with some 
degree of obsolescent tourist facilities and price competitiveness losses are posing 
gradually more difficulties in keeping the market share of the Spanish tourism 
industry. Similarly to goods, it would appear advisable to shift from broad price 
competition towards more differentiated tourist services in order to maintain the 
dynamism of this sector in Spain. 
  
                                                 
64 The political unrest in some competitor areas has to some extent limited the adverse effects on 
the tourism demand services addressed to Spain during the last decade. However, generalised 
lower transport costs have dramatically enhanced the attractiveness of far destinations that enter in 
competition with domestic ones while encouraging Spaniards to travel overseas and thus changing 
existing patterns. 
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